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For 60 years, the project of European unity has promoted peace, social progress and impressive stability. 
Yet none of these gains can be taken for granted. Today, Europe faces disruptive technological change, 
increasing global competition and the destructive forces of climate change. These unprecedented 
trends threaten to critically undermine the European model of social cohesion and social sustainability. 
This situation calls for a deep and rapid transformation of our economic system, which will be critical to 
Europe’s future prosperity and cohesion, its global role and its ecosystems. 
Europe needs renewal. Business as usual is no longer an option. Fast-changing technologies offer 
strategic opportunities if we are able to seize them. The goal of decarbonisation also represents a historic 
opportunity and mission. Decarbonisation can mobilise efforts across Europe to renew its economy, 
not only to achieve sustainability but also to drive innovation and digitalisation, and to restore Europe’s 
competitive position. At the same time, this transition will test Europe’s social model. This model needs 
to adapt quickly to ensure a just transition in which everyone has the skills and support they need to 
contribute and benefit. 
Competitiveness, sustainability and social inclusion have to be addressed together, holistically. Instead of 
merely adapting to change, we need to be pro-active through timely reform and investment that sets us 
on a pathway towards a society that is productive, environmentally sustainable and inclusive, by design.
How to stay competitive amid a technological 
revolution
To be at the innovation frontier, Europe must close the gap in research and development (R&D), 
investments in intangible assets and digitalisation. Europe is not on track to meet its R&D investment 
targets for 2020 and is underinvesting in comparison to its peers. Most of the gap is in corporate R&D. 
Europe is failing to generate new market leaders in technologically strategic sectors. Relatively few 
European Union firms are active or leading innovators and dynamism remains low, with few young firms 
emerging and growing. Relative to the United States, EU firms also underinvest in the broader category 
of intangible assets – like software, data and training – that are vital for digitalisation. EU manufacturers 
have kept up with their US counterparts in adopting digital technologies, but the EU service sector lags 
behind. Digitalisation is associated with improved performance, and most firms say past investments in 
digital technologies were too low. That slow uptake could make the digital gap so wide that it becomes 
permanent, and EU companies could find it difficult to challenge the dominance of foreign firms. 
Europe needs a more enabling environment for competitiveness. Market size, the regulatory environment, 
uncertainty and skills are important issues in Europe. They are often associated with persistent frictions 
and impediments to the full realisation of the EU single market and the efficient reallocation of resources. 
Investment in infrastructure in the European Union is falling, with negative implications for growth. Substantial 
increases in infrastructure investment are needed in certain sectors, like transport and digital services.
Europe needs a pro-active policy to enhance skills, particularly as a complement to digitalisation. A 
lack of skills is now the most-reported barrier to investment in Europe. This lack of skills has particular 
implications for innovation and digitalisation, with firms citing lack of staff with the right skills as the 
main barrier to adopting digital technologies.
Europe’s innovators need a more supportive financial system. Young, small and innovative firms 
face greater constraints accessing bank finance, while equity financing in Europe is comparatively 
underdeveloped. A lack of finance undermines resilience, innovation and growth in new technology 
sectors. Fast-growing firms face constraints in the form of finance, skills and regulations, while uncertainty 
may be a key deterrent to growth. More than ten years after the financial crisis, the financial sector remains 
fragmented, with limited private sector risk-sharing.
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The current wave of technological change brings both opportunities and risks for social inclusion. 
Efforts to adapt to the technological transformation might enhance the European market’s dynamism 
and efficiency. Digitalisation is expected to lead to a “hollowing-out” of the labour market, however. Early 
investment in appropriate skills could help steer firms away from labour-saving automation towards job 
creation through the development of new products and services.
How to improve well-being within ecological limits
Sustainability requires a comprehensive shift from linear to circular models. The European economy, 
like many others, is pushing up against the boundaries of what the Earth can sustain. This is most evident 
in the climate crisis. The decarbonisation scenarios presented by the European Commission involve a 
wide range of actions covering multiple economic sectors. Decarbonisation will require substantial extra 
investment by businesses and households. So far, progress has been made by picking the low-hanging 
fruit, with little effect on the way businesses operate and Europeans live. Going forward, a common 
European vision and support will be essential.
Europe needs a mission-oriented approach to achieving key breakthroughs for decarbonisation. 
The zero-carbon transition has far-reaching implications for Europe’s competitiveness, from energy and 
resource dependence to technological leadership. Europe’s energy trade balance will improve drastically, 
but it could become more dependent on other raw materials. Meanwhile, rapid technological change is 
aiding the transition, but innovation needs to accelerate. Leadership in innovation will determine who 
reaps the most benefits, in terms of competitiveness, from the energy transition, with China already 
quickly emerging as a world leader in clean tech. 
The transition to a zero-carbon economy needs to be a just transition. The transition is likely to be 
positive for growth and jobs, overall, but the impact will vary for different regions, underlining the 
importance of EU support for regional adaptation and diversification. Energy costs are projected to 
rise significantly, but at a slower rate than income after 2030. Nonetheless, energy costs are not borne 
equally across income groups: low-income households are likely to face a greater need to adjust, with 
less capacity to do so. Energy poverty is not just a risk: it is a reality for many people in Europe, and it 
must be addressed in any successful transition.
How to ensure Europe works for everyone
The European Union has been a motor of social and economic convergence, but new axes of regional 
divergence need to be addressed. Structural change and the agglomeration effects of cities seem to 
be creating a regional “middle-income trap”. This concentration of growth in metropolitan areas has an 
upside for global competitiveness, but it also comes at a cost.
Persistent or rising income inequality within EU countries is a concern. Income inequality has risen since 
the 1980s. European tax and welfare systems have moderated, but not eliminated, this rise. Persistent 
inequalities in income also exist along gender lines, while the enormous burden of unpaid household 
and care work is not equally shared and will grow as populations age. Work-life balance in the European 
Union is deteriorating, with negative implications for well-being and productivity. 
For younger generations in Europe, progress on social mobility may have stalled, with negative 
implications for competitiveness. Inequality of opportunity is partly driven by inequality of income and 
wealth, but labour market conditions and high-quality public goods and services can have a dramatic 
impact on the equality of chances. At the EU level, employment has reached record levels, but significant 
differences between EU countries remain, spurring a wave of migration within the European Union and 
increasing competition for top skills. The quality and accessibility of basic services in the European Union 
is far from equal, and a crisis-related decline in social capital expenditure is a severe concern, especially 
in the context of ageing and urbanisation. 
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Europe must invest in greater social inclusion to create a competitive and sustainable economy. 
Universal public services and work-life balance matter for productivity. So do equality of opportunity 
and, by extension, inequalities of income and wealth. Such fairness also matters for solidarity and 
consent, without which collective responses to common challenges become impossible. Redistributive 
social policy is important, particularly in reducing inequality of opportunity, but there is a need to think 
beyond just laissez-faire and income redistribution. We need to focus more on getting the institutional 
conditions right to make markets more inclusive, sustainable and competitive from the start. Europe is 
still a global leader in social inclusion, but our social model must be updated to meet new challenges.
We must be ambitious and make up for lost time 
We have a unique chance to transform the European economy, an opportunity we cannot afford to miss. 
Delays in addressing the climate crisis could come at a terrible cost. Yet this crisis is also an unprecedented 
opportunity to renew the European economy and restore its ability to compete. Regaining ground in 
innovation and the digital transformation is essential for Europe’s future, but like decarbonisation could 
also create stark winners and losers. Europe’s social model needs to adapt quickly. We need to heal the 
divide between people and territories. We need to ensure that everyone has the support necessary to fully 
contribute to – and enjoy the benefits of – these historic transitions. We need a single concerted, holistic 
response. Competitiveness, sustainability and inclusion have to be addressed together, as complementary 
parts of the whole, along with the trade-offs and synergies between them.
We must create a society that is productive, 
sustainable and inclusive by design
This means getting the conditions right for rapid and inclusive transformation. It means deep strategic 
thinking, with prioritisation and frontloading of policies. We need to get the whole ecosystem right for 
innovation and competitiveness, including removal of barriers to social mobility. Decarbonisation now 
requires society-wide transformation in which businesses and households all have the institutional 
conditions, guidance and support they need. 
We must work together as Europeans
Scale and coordination matter. Innovative firms need a deeper single market. The transformation of our 
energy and transports systems requires collaboration across the continent. Rapid innovation and the scaling-
up of key strategic technologies need to be driven by the concerted, coordinated efforts of EU countries. 
Meanwhile, a deeper single market for labour is needed to create and extend opportunities and to better 
match workers’ skills to market needs. Policy action is needed to ensure that EU savings get to where they 
are needed across the continent to finance the tremendous investment required.
We must invest
The investment decisions we make now will determine success or failure in the decades ahead. We 
face urgent, structural needs for accelerated investment. High-quality investment in skills lies at the 
core of our ability to thrive in a digitalising, decarbonising world, and to do so in a way that leaves no 
one behind. Investment in R&D and the adoption of new technologies by business is the motor of both 
these transitions. Meanwhile, Europe’s infrastructure – energy, digital, environmental, transport, social – is 
ageing as fast as its population. It needs to be expanded and transformed to meet the challenges ahead. 
We need to be pro-active yet also rigorous to ensure that sound and timely investment takes place to 
meet these wide-ranging needs. The European Investment Bank, as the Union’s dedicated investment 
promotion institution, has the experience and capacity to be the cornerstone of these efforts. 
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Introduction
The European project has been a success. Following the catastrophe of war, Europe’s prevailing social 
model helped to achieve a remarkable recovery. With globally competitive, expanding economies, 
complemented by unparalleled social safety nets, this European model offered people a vision of inclusive 
prosperity, fostering solidarity across borders. It brought countries and people together. It enabled 
an extension of solidarity to former communist countries, sharing benefits of progressive economic 
convergence and rising quality of life. 
However, as the world economy has become more open and globalised, Europe’s ability to generate 
growing prosperity has been increasingly challenged. Many regions have struggled to adapt in the 
face of structural change and deindustrialisation. While the European Union has been a “convergence 
machine” in helping new members catch up, inequality within countries has grown, starting as early as 
the 1980s. In the 1990s, Europe was late in catching the first wave of information technology. Since the 
global financial crisis, Europe has entered a period of overall weak and uneven growth that has placed 
great strains on Europe’s social fabric, excluding millions from the labour market and bringing certain 
macroeconomic imbalances within the European economy to the point of crisis.
European solidarity and common vision has suffered. Appetite for further projects of collective action 
and political integration has dwindled. This has happened, moreover, at an inopportune moment, with 
Europe already running out of time to respond to a number of accelerating global megatrends:
•  The digital revolution: How can Europe seize the opportunities arising from automation, artificial 
intelligence and other emerging digital technologies? How can we maximise positive social impacts 
and mitigate negative ones? 
•  Intensifying global competition: How can Europe respond to increased global competition, with 
new high-tech economies like China, shifting geopolitics, and renewed potential for conflicts over 
issues such as resource access and cybersecurity?
•  Environmental breakdown: How can we revolutionise our economic system so that it works in 
harmony with the environment, helping to avert catastrophic climate change and the destruction of 
our land and water ecosystems?
•  Ageing demographics: With the populations of many EU countries set to shrink and the numbers 
of older people growing, how can Europe adapt its welfare systems to accommodate slower growth 
and rising social commitments? 
These are not challenges that any European country can hope to address adequately on its own. This 
is “the European paradox”: ambitious supranational collective action has become imperative, but at a 
moment when the appetite for such cooperation has faltered. 
These trends present not only threats, but also immense opportunities that risk slipping through our hands. 
Europe’s response to these challenges must embrace technological change to enhance productivity, quality 
of life and global competitiveness. It must also rebuild upon new, ecologically sustainable foundations 
that could contribute to making Europe both more competitive and a better place to live. Finally, Europe 
must address social sustainability to ensure that creating a competitive and ecologically sustainable 
economy does not mean further social exclusion that could undermine the whole endeavour. It needs 
to renew the social compact that helped to make Europe so successful. 
This report examines these three intricately-linked issues: economic, ecological and social. 
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What is competitiveness?
Europe must invest in long-term, productivity-driven competitiveness, and this is the focus of this 
report. Long-term competitiveness involves innovation. It also involves the spread of new technologies, 
knowledge and skills throughout the economy and requires the emergence of innovative firms capable 
of taking a global lead. It requires resources to flow as efficiently as possible towards the most productive 
usage. It depends, moreover, on a broad enabling environment where mission-driven and forward-
looking public policy plays a critical role. Productivity growth at the firm level then supports trade and 
participation in the higher-value segments of global value chains, which in turn supports employment 
and growing prosperity.
What is ecological sustainability? 
Europe’s prosperity has been built on a carbon-intensive and materially wasteful model that is no 
longer viable. Sustainability means we have to switch to a new model. The European economy must 
decarbonise, striving for net-zero emissions by 2050, given the irreversible momentum of climate change 
already under way. At the same time, our economy has to move away from linear extraction-to-pollution 
material pathways, to achieve a circular economy. The economy must become circular in a broad sense: 
not just minimising waste and maximising materials, but also minimising fossil fuel use and moving to 
sustainable, regenerative interactions between human production systems and global ecosystems. In 
this way, it can provide a basis for the economic well-being of all. 
Figure 1
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What is social sustainability?
If ecological sustainability requires a transition from linear pathways to circular ones, then so does social 
sustainability. Firms in a market economy are dependent on households and the State for labour and 
skills; for supportive regulation and the institutions that underpin market activity; for public goods such 
as basic infrastructure and research; and for the relative stability and predictability that make long-term 
investment possible. 
These inputs and enabling conditions cannot be taken for granted. They depend on active public policy 
and elements such as a degree of social mobility and public trust in institutions. In turn, this social compact 
is strongly influenced by the availability of resources for policy implementation, working conditions 
and the degree of income inequality. Lastly, social sustainability is affected  by the long-term trends of 
demographic change and migration, which, if well managed, may create opportunities, but may also 
threaten the sustainability of government policies and popular consent. 
The risk for Europe is a (further) drift towards a more linear social model. “Linear” here means a market 
economy that takes advantage of the legacy of past investment, mining social capital such as trust, skills 
and other public goods, without investing in their renewal. Linear means prioritising immediate private 
gain without regard to negative social consequences such as excessive inequalities, left-behind regions, 
a lack of social mobility, overwork and the erosion of popular consent. 
A positive vision for Europe
In the end, we are not faced with three challenges – economic, ecological and social – but one. Economic 
competitiveness, ecological sustainability and social inclusion must be seen as three elements of the 
same process: if one is left out, the whole process is likely to fail. This is why this report addresses all three 
with a particular focus on the complex, multidimensional interlinkages between them. It draws on a wide 
range of research, with particular reference to insights from the EIB’s Investment Report 2018/2019 and the 
EIB Group Survey on Investment and Investment Finance (EIBIS), which queries 12 500 European firms.
The vital role of long-term, patient investment is a key theme that emerges from this report. The critical 
role of collaboration across Europe, to achieve a socially and ecologically sustainable and competitive 
economy, is another. This report concludes by discussing the nature and scale of the investment strategy 
needed. It also emphasises the opportunities and potential for European cooperation. It is only by working 
together as Europeans that we will be able to face the massive challenges ahead. 
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Staying competitive amid a technological 
revolution
To sustain and enhance its prosperity, Europe needs to excel in high value-added activities within globalised 
systems of production. It must achieve a leading presence in strategic technologies and sectors, and 
accelerate the spread of innovations throughout the rest of the economy. 
Up to now, Europe has been successful in certain sectors: automotive, pharmaceuticals and aerospace. 
These sectors have been a cornerstone of the economy. But Europe has also fallen behind in areas such 
as consumer electronics, digital services and the widespread adoption of key enabling technologies 
like artificial intelligence. Most European business champions were created during an earlier phase of 
industrialisation, and many of them are linked to carbon-intensive technologies. No truly European giant 
has emerged in digital services. 
Looking forward, Europe is not well placed to benefit from the spread of digital technologies. Big data 
analytics, the internet of things, advanced robotics, machine learning and other applications of artificial 
intelligence will have a dramatic effect on modes of production and consumption, not just creating new 
industries but having a far-reaching impact across all sectors. Decarbonisation, meanwhile, will necessitate 
changing patterns of consumption and production with severe implications for some traditional sectors 
and the regions that have depended on them. 
These shifts are happening against the backdrop of an increasingly competitive global environment 
in which past successes count for little. Continuing globalisation implies new opportunities through 
specialisation and trade, but also greater pressure on firms and industries to keep up with global peers. 
As with the first wave of globalisation, shifts in demand for skills and the location of different activities 
can have implications for inclusion, potentially driving greater inequality. Alternatively, recent moves 
towards greater protectionism could result in slower growth and intensified state-backed efforts to 
dominate in strategic technologies and industries.
New technologies will thus have a dramatic effect on European society, but the nature of those changes 
– whether jobs are created or lost, or whether regions catch up or get left behind – depends to a great 
extent on whether European firms and industries are able to adapt fully and quickly to changing demands 
and to seize new opportunities. It depends on Europe’s ability to compete. 
A framework for understanding competitiveness
Competitiveness is ultimately about productivity. In the long term, it is about being able to compete 
in activities that generate a high return, moving up the value chain where possible. Such productivity 
then underpins trade performance, providing the basis of European prosperity, now and in the future. 
Productivity growth depends on a broad process of innovation, the adoption of innovation, and a 
reallocation of resources within the economy to increase efficiency. This process starts, in a sense, with 
research and the development of new ideas, products and processes that lie at the origin of technological 
change. But R&D is only the start; just as important is the larger process of innovation adoption and 
adaptation by firms. The latter takes place through new investment in tangibles assets, such as more 
advanced machinery and equipment, and in intangible assets such as software, data, brands and employee 
skills. It also takes place through the dynamic process by which new, innovative firms are created and are 
able to grow, replacing less competitive firms, allowing labour and capital resources to move to more 
productive uses. As a result, the  productivity level of the whole economy rises.
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The broad innovation process depends on an enabling environment. An enabling environment has 
many elements: the availability of finance adapted to the needs of innovative and high-growth-potential 
companies; regulatory frameworks that do not impose unnecessary barriers but instead set standards 
and help create markets for new technologies; critical infrastructure that allows new technologies to 
be deployed at scale; public investment in skills; public support for basic research and pre-commercial 
R&D; and the political stability and regulatory predictability that is essential for long-term investment.
Public policy plays a critical, mission-setting role. It clearly has a vital role to play in creating an enabling 
environment, but it should not be merely a neutral bystander, or reactive. Experience has shown how the 
State can be active in setting the direction of innovation through a mission-driven approach, and needs 
to do so.1 Whether on decarbonisation, digitalisation, or other societal challenges, European institutions 
and Member States need to set ambitious EU-wide goals to push innovation boundaries, to incentivise 
risk-taking, and to make sure all the enabling conditions are in place. 
Investment in research and development
Global expenditure on research and development has more than doubled in the last two decades, 
reflecting its growing importance for competitiveness. Global R&D spending rose from USD 722 billion 
in 2000 to USD 1.9 trillion by 2015. While R&D expenditure rose in all major economies, China accounted 
for more than 30% of the global increase, overtaking the European Union and approaching the United 
States in its share of global R&D spending.2 
1 European Commission, DG Research and Innovation, “A renewed European Agenda for Research and Innovation - Europe’s chance to shape its future”, 
(COM (2018) 306). 
2 EIB Investment Report 2018/2019. 
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Europe is suffering from an R&D gap. In terms of R&D as a share of gross domestic product (GDP), 
European spending has remained stagnant at 2%, clearly behind the United States and Japan and recently 
overtaken by China. Within Europe there is great diversity, with R&D spending in some EU countries 
reaching levels similar to Japan and the United States. Nonetheless, even for the rest of the European 
Union, convergence implies a shift into more knowledge and R&D-intensive activities. When compared 
to the European Union’s 2020 target of R&D spending equal to 3% of GDP, Europe is facing an investment 
gap of some EUR 110 billion per year, with the shortfall mostly in business R&D (Figure 3).
Figure 3 
R&D investment in the European Union and selected countries, 2001-2017 (% GDP)







2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Source: Eurostat.
Relatively few EU firms are active or leading innovators. In line with aggregate figures, EIB Investment 
Survey data reveals that only 27% of EU firms invest non-negligible amounts in R&D, compared with 
45% in the United States. Only 8% of EU firms can be categorised as “leading innovators” that invest 
significantly in R&D and introduce products new to their market, against 16% in the United States. The 
gap is even larger for young firms, which are more likely to be a leading innovator in the United States 
and slightly less likely to be one in the European Union. However, EU firms are twice as likely to focus 
on adopting existing innovations (24% vs 12%), with this figure rising to 31% in new Member States, 
signalling a process of catching-up.
The European Union is losing ground among the world’s top firms for R&D spending. Just 2 500 firms 
account for around 90% of global business R&D spending. Among these, China’s presence has grown 
dramatically. Moreover, the share of new entrants to the group is notably low in Europe, compared to 
the United States, illustrating Europe’s reliance on long-established companies and suggesting that 
innovative firms in Europe face challenges in scaling-up. The European Union accounts for 48% of top 
firms’ R&D investment in the automotive sector, 26% in pharma and biotech, and only 13% in the tech 
sector, which covers electronics and digital products and services.
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Figure 4 
Distribution of global top R&D companies (%)
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Note:   Top 1 338 firms by R&D spending for 2006 and top 2 500 for 2017. Source: EIB calculations based on the EU Industrial R&D 
Investment Scoreboard.
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The adoption of digital technologies
Looking beyond R&D, EU firms also appear to underinvest in the broader category of intangible 
assets, and even in machinery and equipment, relative to their US counterparts. Investment in 
intangible assets such as employee skills, organisational processes, and digital assets is recognised as 
playing a very important role in the spread of innovation, complementing R&D. The EIBIS survey reveals 
that firms in the European Union invest proportionately less in intangibles, compared with US firms (36% 
vs 45%). The spread of digital and other new technologies in industry is fostered through investment in 
new, state-of-the-art machinery and equipment. In this respect, it is of concern that since 2012 a large 
gap in machinery and equipment investment (one percentage point of GDP) has opened up between 
the United States and the European Union. 
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EU manufacturing firms are at par with their US counterparts in the adoption of digital technologies, 
but the EU service sector lags behind. “State-of-the-art” increasingly means digital. In manufacturing, 
investment is still centred on tangible machinery and equipment, but the integration of digital technologies, 
such as advanced robotics, is becoming ubiquitous at the technological frontier. In services, the shift of 
the model is often more dramatic, from offline to online, with a step change in opportunities to apply 
productivity-enhancing technology. Accordingly, the rate of adoption of some form of digital technology 
in services is high: 83% in the United States, while the EU service sector lags somewhat with 74%. In the 
manufacturing sector, 60% of firms on both sides of the Atlantic have adopted digital technologies. 
Digitalisation is associated with improved firm performance. Survey evidence shows that firms that 
adopt digital technologies tend to be more productive, to invest more and to engage more in innovation 
activities. Firms credit recent digitalisation with enhanced sales in both the European Union and United 
States, estimating that it has increased sales by 10% on average. 
On balance, firms consider their past investments in digital technologies to have been too low. Firms 
reporting “too low” digital investment exceed those that report it as “too high” by 50 percentage points 
in manufacturing and 30 percentage points in services. The goal of enhancing the productivity, quality 
and flexibility of production processes is the main motor behind the adoption of digital technologies, 
particularly in manufacturing. While EU firms seem particularly motivated by efficiency gains, US firms 
tend to focus more on using new technologies to create new market opportunities. 
Figure 6 
Will digitalisation increase competition?
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Note:   Firms are grouped by quintile in terms of total factor productivity. Source: EIBIS Digital and Skills, 2018.
Europe’s slow start in digitalisation could create permanent gaps, with market dominance hard to 
challenge. Meanwhile, survey data supports the hypothesis that the most advanced digital firms face 
weaker competitive pressure, in both the European Union and the United States. On the one hand, firms 
that have adopted digital technologies are achieving higher mark-ups on average than non-digital firms. 
On the other, while most firms expect the spread of digital technologies to increase competition, the 
most productive digital adopters actually expect the threat from new competitors to decrease (Figure 6). 
This concentration of market power underlines how technological change poses risks to social inclusion, 
as well as to European competitiveness, if Europe is not able to generate its own superstars.
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Is Europe providing an enabling environment for 
competitiveness?
Innovation in Europe is constrained on a number of levels. These constraints include the quality of 
the regulatory and institutional environment, market size and openness, policy predictability, public 
investment in basic research and infrastructure, and the availability of labour with appropriate skills. 
Market size, the regulatory environment and uncertainty are important issues in the European context. 
Market size is an important factor in the ability of innovative firms to scale up. The incompleteness of 
the single market, particularly with regard to digital services and services more generally, is a crucial 
constraining factor. Business and labour market regulations are seen as obstacles to investment by almost 
two thirds of European firms. However, regulations also play an important role in establishing framework 
conditions for markets (including the single market), in the roll-out of new technologies, and in avoiding 
negative environmental and social consequences that would impede economic performance, as well as 
impact general well-being. Effective regulation and public administration, without unnecessary barriers, 
is therefore key. An even more important barrier to investment, reported by 71% of firms, is uncertainty. 
Uncertainty reflects a lack of macroeconomic and regulatory predictability and political stability. 
Skills are the most-reported barrier to investment in Europe, with particular implications for innovation 
and digitalisation. In 2018, 77% of firms reported availability of skills to be a barrier to investment. For 
firms carrying out R&D or adopting innovations, this rises to 82% and 79% respectively, a relationship 
that proves highly significant using a regression analysis. 
Lack of staff with the right skills is the main barrier to the adoption of digital technologies. When firms 
are asked to specify the main barrier to investment in digital technologies, 40% of those interviewed 
in the European Union cite the availability of staff with the right skills, far above any other category. 
Looking forward, 60% of firms expect digitalisation to increase demand for staff with higher-level skills. 
Firms adopting advanced digital technologies also report unfilled vacancies more often than other firms. 
Figure 7  
Impact of digitalisation affects firms’ experience of skill constraints
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Source:   EIBIS 2018.
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Lack of appropriate skills is not only a result of digitalisation, but also a barrier to the successful 
adoption of digital technologies. While lack of staff with the right skills is reported by firms across the 
European Union to be the main barrier to investment in digital technologies, there are telling regional 
differences. In Northern and Southern Europe, firms are significantly more likely to see skills availability 
as a barrier to digitalisation if they have recently invested in digital technology, and also if they credit 
this investment with an increase in sales. This suggests that skill constraints start to bite particularly 
when digitalisation is successful and the firm is growing. In Central and Eastern Europe, however, the 
reverse is true: skill constraints are reported more frequently by non-digital firms, and among firms that 
credit past digitalisation with a zero or negative impact on sales.3 In this region, the availability of skills 
appears to be not just a constraint on the growth of digital adopters, but a factor deterring adoption or 
undermining its success.
EU investment in infrastructure is falling, with negative implications for growth. Infrastructure 
investment has been declining since 2010, with the latest data suggesting a stabilisation at around 75% 
of its pre-financial crisis level. This fall has not been driven by a saturation of investment needs. One in 
three large municipalities in Europe said that infrastructure investment was below local needs, while 
infrastructure investment fell most in regions where infrastructure quality was already relatively low. An 
analysis of the effect of regional improvements in transport, digital and education infrastructure suggests 
that firms have been able to grow more, in response to positive global demand shocks, in regions where 
infrastructure quality is better. 
Substantial increases in infrastructure investment are needed in certain sectors. For example, returning 
to pre-crisis (2006-10) levels of investment in transport infrastructure would imply an annual increase in 
investment (over the 2017 level) of EUR 32.5 billion. Clearing the accumulated backlog since 2010 within 
a decade would increase this figure to around EUR 50 billion. In the telecommunications sector, meeting 
the European Commission’s “European Gigabit Society” target by 2025 is estimated to require around 
EUR 70 billion of investment a year, some EUR 20 billion a year more than the forecast level of market-
driven capital expenditure.4
Figure 8 
EU infrastructure investment  
by institutional sector (% of GDP) 
Figure 9 
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Note:  Based on Eurostat, Projectware, EPEC data. Data for 
2017 are provisional. Data are missing for Belgium, 
Croatia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and the United 
Kingdom. Source: EIB Infrastructure Database.
Source:  Eurostat capital stock data and World Economic 
Forum competitiveness data.  
Comparison 2016 vs 2008.
3 In this report, unless otherwise defined, Northern Europe comprises Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, France, Finland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom; Eastern Europe comprises Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovenia and 
Slovakia; and Southern Europe comprises Cyprus, Italy, Greece, Malta, Portugal and Spain.
4 European Commission, “Connectivity for a Competitive Digital Single Market - Towards a European Gigabit Society”, COM (2016) 587.
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Is Europe’s financial sector supportive of innovation?
Young, small and innovative firms face greater constraints accessing bank finance. The number of 
finance-constrained firms in the European Union has fallen to only 5%, but firms that are young, small, 
innovative or that invest heavily in intangibles, are proportionally more affected. This reflects the fact that 
bank finance continues to play a very dominant role in European economies (particularly in comparison 
with the United States) and the fact that bank lending is less adept at meeting the needs of such firms 
than equity finance. Collateral requirements and financing costs are the main sources of dissatisfaction, 
notably for young firms and those investing heavily in intangibles. The financial constraints faced by 
innovative firms stand in contrast to their relatively strong performance and financial health. 
Equity financing in Europe is comparatively underdeveloped, undermining resilience to shocks, 
innovation and growth in new technology sectors. Private equity, venture capital and listed equity 
funding all lag behind the United States and the most advanced Asian countries on several fronts, leaving 
European firms more dependent on bank lending and weakening the economy’s resilience to financial 
shocks. A greater role for equity would promote risk-sharing across the private sector and the improved 
allocation of capital across the European Union. Expanding risk-taking and helping to avoid the growth-
stage trap in a firm’s development would promote innovation and European competitiveness in new 
emerging technologies. 
High-growth enterprises face elevated constraints in terms of finance, skills and regulations, while 
uncertainty may be a key deterrent of growth. In Europe, from 2003 to 2016 the fastest-growing 8% of 
firms – mostly small businesses in high-tech and knowledge-intensive industries – created 43% of new 
jobs. Regardless of profitability, these high-growth enterprises are more likely to be finance-constrained. 
These firms typically have high leverage levels and risk profiles, making them less attractive to banks 
and more likely to apply for equity financing. Growing fast, they are significantly more likely to identify 
skills and regulations as barriers to further investment, relative to other firms. By contrast, among firms 
with similar profitability but not (yet) high growth, uncertainty stands out as a more frequent complaint.5
Figure 10 
Venture capital funds raised in the 
European Union and the United States 
(EUR billion)
Figure 11 
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5 Annalisa Ferrando, A., Pal, R. and Durante, E., “Financing and obstacles for high growth enterprises: the European case”, EIB Working Papers 2019(03).
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Figure 12  
Innovative firms: more competitive, better finances, more constrained
Firms that registered a patent in the last five years, compared to others:
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Source:   EIBIS 2018.
Note:   FDI= foreign direct investment; EBITDA= earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation; ROIC= return on 
invested capital.
Is competitiveness bad for inclusion?
The current wave of technological advances brings both opportunities and risks. By enabling further 
growth in productivity, this wave has the potential to raise economic well-being throughout society. 
The fast development and widespread adoption of new technologies will be essential in the transition 
to a carbon-neutral and circular economy, as long as change is steered away from resource- and waste-
intensive paths and towards needed solutions. On the other hand, the acceleration of digitalisation 
and automation could have dramatic effects on inequality and social inclusion. Rapid technological 
change poses a challenge for some industrial sectors and types of employment, potentially aggravating 
unemployment and economic exclusion in some regions and for some categories of workers. At the 
same time, evidence exists that disruptive technologies are leading to national and global concentrations 
of market power that have implications for both economic inequality and Europe’s ability to compete 
successfully on the global stage.
Digitalisation is already leading to a hollowing-out of the labour market. Every wave of automation has 
given rise to fears of technological unemployment – the fear that robots will take our jobs. The evidence 
thus far, however, is that employment levels have been maintained through shifts to new branches of 
production, as in the historical decline of employment in agriculture and manufacturing and the rise 
of services. But such transitions are not without implications. The shift to services has been shown to 
have been accompanied by a polarisation in the demand for skills, with a shift from medium-skilled 
manufacturing jobs to low-skilled jobs in services, leading to a widening gap in labour incomes.6 
6 OECD, “Achieving inclusive growth in the face of digital transformation and the future of work”, OECD report to G-20 Finance Ministers, 19 March 2018. Autor, 
D. and Salomons, A. (2017); “Robocalypse Now: Does Productivity Growth Threaten Employment?”, European Central Bank Conference Proceedings, June 2017.
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EIBIS data supports this expectation for the current wave of digitalisation in the European Union and the 
United States, revealing higher employment growth for the highest and lowest-wage positions at the 
expense of jobs in the middle of the wage spectrum. The result is labour market polarisation in which 
middle-income workers potentially face displacement into lower-skilled and lower-wage employment. 
Figure 13  
Change in employment over the wage spectrum



















Source:   EIBIS 2018.
Early investment in appropriate skills could help steer firms from focusing on labour-saving automation 
towards the creation of new products and services, and therefore jobs. A lack of staff with the right 
skills may not only be a barrier to the adoption of digital technologies by firms, but may also distort 
firms’ decision-making on the type and purpose of digitalisation they pursue. Firms investing in digital 
technology to provide customers with new services (in the service sector) or products (in manufacturing) 
are significantly more likely to see lack of skills as a barrier than firms using digital technology to automate 
or otherwise find efficiencies in the production of existing products and services (Figure 14). This suggests 
two things: 
•  innovation involving the introduction of new products and services to the market is likely to be 
constrained by the availability of skills, while a focus on labour-saving automation is likely to be less 
sensitive to skills availability, and may relieve some of the need to recruit workers with particular skills; 
•  a lack of workers with required skills may not only be a result of changing technology and changing 
skill requirements, but may also influence the direction of innovation and the adoption of technology. 
Skill constraints may make firms more likely to direct investment towards the automation of existing 
production processes, in a way that saves labour or reduces skill requirements, and less likely to 
engage in skill-intensive innovation.
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The adoption of digital technologies for the automation and simplification of tasks is not a bad thing 
as it raises productivity. However, it needs to be complemented by the generation of new jobs creating 
previously unavailable goods and services, as has happened historically with the shifts from agriculture 
and manufacturing. If automation is principally driven by skills constraints, it will have negative implications 
for employment and for labour’s share of income, exacerbating inequality. Policies targeting skills 
development  should not just be reactive, but pro-active. Frontloading support for investment in skills 
could create an enabling environment for new product innovation, helping to forestall negative impacts 
of automation on employment and inclusion. 
Figure 14  
EU firms reporting a lack of staff with the right skills, by purpose of digitalisation (% of firms)


















Source:   EIBIS 2018.
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Growing well-being within ecological limits
The global environment is changing at an unprecedented speed. Average temperatures are already 1°C 
above pre-industrial levels, with a 1.5°C rise already effectively locked-in.7 Extreme weather events, such 
as severe heatwaves in Europe, already appear to be much more frequent.8 Meanwhile, the impacts of 
uncontrolled resource extraction and pollution on marine and land ecosystems, as well as on human 
health, are a cause of growing global concern. 
It is clear that time to act is running out. The European Union has embraced the Paris Agreement and set 
an ambitious target of achieving carbon neutrality by 2050.9 The European Union is on course to reach its 
2020 climate targets, and has taken necessary steps to achieve its 2030 targets (-40% in emissions). Yet, 
worryingly, current policies are projected to achieve no more than a 60% reduction in emissions by 2050. 
As climate change accelerates, the window of opportunity to avoid disastrous disruptions to both 
ecosystems and human societies is rapidly closing. Decarbonisation will require far-reaching changes in 
technology, infrastructure, business models and mindsets. The longer action is delayed, the steeper the 
slopes for reducing emissions in the future. Decisive action now makes the transition less disruptive and 
reduces the risk of reaching irreversible tipping points. It provides forward-looking guidance, allows for the 
development of long-term local and national decarbonisation strategies, reduces the risk of coordination 
failures and the escalation of future costs, as well as of further investment in carbon-intensive economic 
activities, industrial equipment and durable goods that may end up becoming stranded assets. 
Decarbonisation has the potential to create both winners and losers. It has the potential to create and 
exacerbate economic injustice. Moreover, the resistance spurred by such exclusion could make success 
unattainable. The transition to a zero-carbon economy needs to be a just transition: one that is socially 
sustainable, that commands popular support and that does not shift burdens on to those least able to 
carry them. It will also require large-scale cooperation and coordination – a common mission driving 
innovation and forward-looking investment. In fact, decarbonisation is an opportunity to re-establish 
the European economy as one that is not only carbon-neutral, but competitive, inclusive and prosperous. 
The transition to a zero-carbon, circular economy
The European economy is exceeding planetary boundaries with respect to the impact per capita 
that can be safely sustained. Human activity can push natural systems beyond stable states, causing 
abrupt and possibly irreversible damage. Because of uncertainty about when such “tipping points” are 
reached, the planetary boundaries framework identifies three zones: safe, increasing risk and high risk. 
Stabilising global temperature at no more than 2 °C above pre-industrial levels is estimated to imply a 
safe emissions limit for greenhouse gases (GHGs) per capita globally that is just one sixth of current EU 
consumption-based emissions per capita (Figure 15). Moreover, the European Union’s throughput of raw 
materials still takes place at a globally unsustainable level, despite progress towards a circular economy, 
and phosphorus and nitrogen run-off from agriculture is at levels that already contribute to oxygen-
depleted “dead-zones” in the world’s oceans. Freshwater scarcity, notably in Southern Europe, may be 
starkly exacerbated by climate change.10
7 IPCC, 2018, “Global warming of 1.5°C. An IPCC Special Report on the impact of global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse 
gas emission pathways, in the context of strengthening the global response to the threat of climate change, sustainable development, and efforts to eradicate 
poverty”, Masson-Delmotte, V. et al (eds).
8 Extreme heatwaves were recorded in Europe in 2014, 2015, 2017 and 2018. Source: European Environment Agency.
9 The Paris Agreement sets all countries the goal of keeping global warming “well below 2°C” above pre-industrial levels, and pursuing efforts to limit the increase 
to 1.5°C (United Nations (2015), The Paris Agreement. To achieve even the less ambitious goal, global emissions need to be halved from their 1990 level by 2050, 
and reduced to net zero by the end of the century. To reduce the risk of massive disruptions from extreme weather events, the +1.5°C goal would require close to 
net-zero global GHG emissions by 2050, particularly if the massive deployment of still-unproven negative emissions technology in the latter half of the century is 
to be avoided.
10 OECD (2017), “Water Risk Hotspots for Agriculture”, OECD Studies on Water, OECD Publishing, Paris.
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Figure 15 















































Note:   EU average is weighted by population. Source: O’Neill, D.W., Fanning, A.L., Lamb, W.F., and Steinberger, J.K. (2018). A good life 
for all within planetary boundaries. Nature Sustainability 1, 88-95. https://www.nature.com/articles/ s41893-018-0021-4.  
For data see: https://goodlife.leeds.ac.uk/download-data/.
Sustainability requires a comprehensive shift from “linear” to “circular”. Europe has to achieve a general 
shift away from linear extraction-to-pollution pathways, towards a more “circular” economy, both in the 
narrower sense of enhanced cyclical reuse and recovery of materials, and in the wider sense of an economy 
founded on sustainable, regenerative interactions between human society and global ecosystems. The 
transition to a zero-carbon economy could facilitate such a shift, as should climate change adaptation. 
The European Commission has now set out scenarios for achieving the Paris Agreement objectives 
in its communication A Clean Planet for All and the supporting analysis.11 Against a baseline scenario that 
forecasts the impact of existing policies and expected trends, the analysis explores how major additional 
investment in the development and deployment of different energy carriers, energy efficiency or the 
circular economy could support the limiting of temperature rises to 2°C (Table 1). It further lays out 
scenarios for pursuing a 1.5°C temperature rise with a focus on either technology-centred solutions or 
or on lifestyle changes and enhancing natural carbon sinks. 
11 European Commission, “In-depth analysis in support of the Commission communication COM(2018) 733”, November 2018.
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The decarbonisation scenarios entail wide-ranging actions across multiple sectors, as set out in A 
Clean Planet for All:
•  Decarbonisation of the electricity supply is already under way, with greenhouse gas-free sources 
already making up more than half of Europe’s electricity supply (56% including nuclear energy). This 
trend needs to continue, with renewables (mainly solar and wind) expected to contribute 80% of 
electricity by 2050, supplemented by 15% from nuclear. The development and deployment of further 
electrification and battery storage, or of alternative energy carriers such as hydrogen and synthetic 
e-fuels, will be required for hard-to-decarbonise sectors. Storage capacity and system flexibility will 
need to be strengthened. 
Table 1 
A Clean Planet for All: emissions reduction scenarios 
Greenhouse gas reduction by 2050*
Baseline scenario Impact of current policies and existing trends:
• EU policies already agreed/proposed by 2018;
• cost of low-carbon technologies assumed to fall over time;
• fossil fuels assumed to become more expensive.
-64%
Scenarios for “well below +2°C” Different scenarios evaluate potential impact, beyond the baseline,  
of alternative technologies/approaches: 
• electrification and battery storage; 
• hydrogen as energy carrier/store; 
• synthetic fuels as energy carrier/store;
• maximising energy efficiency to reduce demand;
•  maximising circular economy processes to reduce demands for primary 
materials and energy.
-85% to -89%
Scenarios for “pursuing efforts  
to achieve +1.5°C”
Two scenarios for achieving net-zero emissions by 2050:
•  1.5TECH: strong reliance on technology options, with significant carbon 
capture and storage and some incentives for land-use carbon sinks;
•  1.5LIFE: assumes a significant drive by businesses and households towards 
a more circular economy and lower-carbon consumption patterns (incl. 
transport and diet), with stronger incentives for land-use carbon sinks.
-100%
*From 1990 levels, including sinks.
Source: European Commission, “In-depth analysis in support of the Commission communication COM(2018) 733”, November 2018.
•  Reducing energy demand through greater energy efficiency in industry, services and housing will 
be no less important than decarbonising the energy supply. While new buildings will need to meet 
“nearly zero-energy” standards, the great majority of buildings in 2050 will still be older stock. The 
renovation rate will need to more than double with renovation also going deeper. Further shifts to 
more energy-efficient equipment and smart building technology will be needed. 
•  Expanding the circular economy through materials reuse, recycling and other forms of recirculation 
and increased product efficiency could reduce emissions in heavy industry by up to 60% by 2050.12 
This will increase competitiveness, reduce reliance on vulnerable imports and mitigate the other 
environmental challenges of over-extraction and pollution.
•  A shift to clean and connected mobility will need a range of measures including modal shifts to rail 
and urban public transport, greater electrification of cars, more use of advanced biofuels, hydrogen 
or e-fuels (particularly for heavy vehicles and aircraft). This will require significant investments in local 
and Europe-wide infrastructure to integrate alternative fuels, facilitate shifts in consumer behaviour 
and promote synergies between transport, digitalisation and electricity networks. 
•  Enhancing land use sustainability is vital to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from agriculture, to 
enhance carbon sinks in forests and soils, and to increase the supply of biofuels. Digitalisation and 
smart technologies have an important role to play, such as in the precision application of fertilisers, 
which can reduce greenhouse gas emissions. 
12 From 1990 levels. Material Economics Sverige AB (2018), “The Circular Economy: a Powerful Force for Climate Mitigation”.
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•  Negative emissions technology will be needed to balance out residual hard-to-abate emissions from 
sources such as industry and agriculture. Concerted efforts to develop and deploy carbon capture 
and storage options will be needed alongside the protection and enhancement of natural sinks. 
•  Climate change adaptation and resilience needs to move to the centre of planning. In a high 
emissions scenario, weather-related disasters could annually affect about two thirds of the EU 
population,13 with losses from flooding alone expected to exceed EUR 1 trillion per year by the end 
of the century.14  Even in a more moderate scenario, and without investment in adaptation, damage 
to Europe’s critical infrastructure could increase tenfold, to EUR 34 billion per year.15 In this context, 
there is a need to both accelerate investment in specific adaptation measures such as flood defences 
and drought adaptation, and ensure that resilience to changing climatic conditions is integral to 
all interventions. There is also a need for actions that have strong mitigation/adaptation synergies 
such as afforestation, the creation of urban green spaces and the preservation and restoration of 
natural marine and terrestrial ecosystems (such as natural wetlands that are effective for both carbon 
sequestration and flood mitigation).
Decarbonisation will require investment to rise considerably. Today, EU countries invest around 2% 
of GDP in energy systems, energy efficiency and related infrastructure. This investment has already 
put us on a moderate decarbonisation pathway, and such efforts already benefit from Member State 
and EU-level public support. However, to achieve zero-net emissions by 2050, the capital stock needs 
to be renewed and relevant investment will need to increase to around 2.8% of GDP over the 2030-
2050 period, or EUR 576 billion per year on average in the most tech-intensive scenario (Table 2). While 
investments of around EUR 200 billion will be needed in power generation and the electricity grid, even 
larger investment is required in energy efficiency, particularly for residential buildings. Investments in 
new vehicles (cars, trains, aircraft, etc.) are expected to rise by as much as EUR 120 billion per year over 
recent levels. Investments in transport infrastructure, including in systems to facilitate the sharing of 
vehicles, are not included in these estimates, and neither are investments specifically for climate change 
adaptation and resilience.
Table 2 
Average annual investment requirement by scenario (EUR billion, 2013 prices) 
Baseline “Well below +2°C” scenarios
“Pursuing efforts  
to achieve +1.5°C”
Min-max range 1.5TECH 1.5LIFE
2021-2030 2031-2050 2031-2050 2031-2050 2031-2050
Energy supply 115 113 133-233 246 201
Power grid 59 71 81-110 103 90
Power plants and boilers 56 42 52-109 121 95
New energy carriers 0.1 0.3 0.9-28.9 22 17
Energy use (excl. transport) 281 264 270-335 330 318
Industry 18 11 13-36 28 22
Residential 199 199 198-235 226 228
Services 64 54 57-67 76 68
Total excluding transport 396 377 438-522 576 519
Transport (vehicles) 685 813 837-907 904 847
Total 1 081 1 190 1 276-1 402 1 480 1 366
Source: European Commission, “In-depth analysis in support of the Commission communication COM(2018) 733”, November 2018.
13 Forzieri et al. (2017), “Increasing risk over time of weather-related hazards to the European population: a data-driven prognostic study”,  
The Lancet Planetary Health, 5(1): 200-208. 
14 Alfieri et al, (2018), “Multi-Model Projections of River Flood Risk in Europe under Global Warming”, Climate,  6 (1) : 6.
15 Forzieri et al (2018), “Escalating impacts of climate extremes on critical infrastructures in Europe”, Global Environmental Change 48, 97-107.
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Most of this investment will be carried out by businesses and households, but European vision and 
support will be essential. This investment will definitely be worthwhile, particularly compared to the 
huge potential costs of climate change. Under a high emissions scenario, the effects of climate change 
could cost the European Union around 2% of GDP per year by 2100.16 If sufficient action is taken, the likely 
improvements in human health from reduced pollution alone have been valued at EUR 200 billion or more 
per year.17 Yet these are positive externalities not reflected in financial returns. Public action is needed to 
ensure that these positive outcomes are taken into account in decision-making. Other market failures must 
be addressed, such as information gaps and misaligned incentives that hold back investment in energy 
efficiency. Perhaps most importantly, it is vital to reduce uncertainty. Businesses and households need 
the European Union and Member States to offer clear long-term signals to encourage forward-looking 
capital expenditure, to set the right course and to avoid a future of stranded assets. 
The financial system has an important role to play to scale up climate finance. The required magnitude 
and pace of investment for efficient decarbonisation will require – alongside the public sector – a major 
effort by the private sector and financial institutions to build a coherent financial system to support 
global sustainable growth. 
Figure 16  
Investment requirements and greenhouse gas reductions for different scenarios
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Source:   European Commission, “In-depth analysis in support of the Commission communication COM(2018) 733”, November 2018.
How will the transition interact with Europe’s 
economic competitiveness? 
The transition to a zero-carbon economy has far-reaching implications for Europe’s competitiveness, 
both related to energy and resource dependence and to technological leadership. While the shift away 
from fossil fuels creates an opportunity to improve Europe’s balance of trade and energy security, it also 
implies a surge of innovation and re-investment in new technologies and in their adoption throughout 
16 JRC (2018), “Climate Impacts in Europe, Final report of the JRC PESETA III project.” doi:10.2760/93257.
17 IIASA (2017), “Costs, benefits and economic impacts of the EU Clean Air Strategy and their implications on innovation and competitiveness”, Table 5, p. 15.  
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the economy. The transition represents an opportunity for Europe to take a strategic lead position, but 
also a risk of being left behind. 
Europe’s energy trade balance will improve drastically, but emerging dependence on other raw 
materials is a concern. Europe’s energy dependence has been on the rise, with 55% of energy imported 
in 2016, up from 47% in 1990. From 2005-2015, fossil fuel imports were equivalent to 2.5% of the European 
Union’s GDP, with supply concentrated among a few external partners. Russia is the main source for crude 
oil (32%), natural gas (40%) and solid fuel (30%). Net-zero emissions scenarios forecast imports to fall to 
20% of the energy required by 2050, representing 0.8% of GDP, or savings of EUR 3 trillion from 2030 to 
2050. However, the energy transition may also trigger increased demand for certain raw materials such 
as lithium, cobalt and graphite, potentially creating a different map of dependency. Circular economy 
measures that not only reduce energy needs, but also mitigate our dependence on other strategic 
resources, are crucial. 
Rapid technological change is making the transition possible, but innovation must accelerate. The 
impact of innovation can be seen in the renewable energy sector. Since 2009, the cost of solar panels has 
fallen by 80% and wind turbines by 30%. By 2020, the costs of all the main renewable power generation 
technologies are expected to have fallen within the range of fossil fuels, with some projects potentially 
undercutting even the most efficient carbon-based generation technologies.18 
Electric mobility is another maturing area. Battery costs have declined by more than 80% since 201019 and 
sales of battery electric vehicles increased 73% in 2018 alone (to 1.5% of the global car market).20 However, 
timely decarbonisation will require a much faster pace of innovation in areas such as alternative energy 
carriers, circular zero-carbon industry, and the bio-economy. While relatively young technologies such 
as Li-ion electric vehicles and battery storage are already established as viable solutions, many other 
technologies still need basic and applied research efforts to be adopted as alternatives to carbon-based 
technologies, especially in transport and industry. 
Leadership in innovation will determine which countries reap the most benefits in terms of 
competitiveness from the energy transition. As technology evolves quickly, innovation and pro-
active policy are paramount to achieve global competitiveness in fields likely to be dominated by early 
movers. To capture and spread the benefits of the energy transition, Europe needs to be a technological 
leader, achieving high value-added participation in key zero-carbon technology value chains, including 
in advanced manufacturing. In the energy sector, most of the top innovators and leaders in the field of 
renewables are European.21 However, the European Union holds only 14% of energy patents in the world, 
lagging behind China (29%) and the United States (18%). 
China has quickly emerged as a world leader in clean tech. Supported by booming domestic demand, 
China has achieved a dominant position in added value created during the manufacturing of photovoltaic 
modules and wind turbines, as well as other clean energy technologies such as LED packages and batteries. 
The total manufacturing value added of these four technology products in China is more than six times 
higher than in Germany: China is particularly dominant in wind turbines (46% of global production) and 
photovoltaic (PV) modules (70%), and is set to dominate battery cell manufacturing (with around 70% 
of global production by 2020). The Chinese market is also leading in battery electric vehicle sales, with 
61% of global sales. Almost one in 20 cars sold in China is of the battery electric or plug-in hybrid type, 
versus one in 50 in the European Union.22
18 International Renewable Energy Agency (2018), “Renewable Power Generation Costs in 2017”.
19 International Energy Agency (2018) “Global EV Outlook 2018”.
20 https://www.jato.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/2018-Full-Year-Global-Sales-Release-Final. pdf, accessed 27 October 2019.
21 In the top 2500 innovating companies in the world, nine focus specifically on alternative energy sources and five of those are European. Out of the Top 100 Energy 
Companies in the world, five are in the renewable energy sector and three of those are European. 
22 Source: IHS, ACEA.
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Europe needs a mission-oriented approach to making key breakthroughs for decarbonisation. 
The successful breakthrough of renewable energy technologies as a competitive alternative for power 
generation, with steep falls in installation and operating costs, provides lessons for the future. Coordinated 
efforts are needed to support innovation from basic research to market upscaling. At the same time, 
national and European policies need to create enabling conditions for upscaling: through an effective, 
single internal market, timely infrastructure investment and measures such as standard-setting, product 
labelling and the strategic use of public procurement. Instruments used to develop the market (such as 
feed-in tariffs in the case of renewable energy) can play a critical role in bridging the “valley of death,” 
or the difficulty in upscaling faced by many new technologies. The “valley of death” is particularly 
pronounced in sectors such as energy and manufacturing, which are characterised by large, long-term, 
infrastructure-sensitive investments. To galvanise action, Europe needs to set itself ambitious goals for 
2050 such as the full integration of renewables into the energy system, the full decarbonisation of the 
steel and chemical industries and the achievement of a natural net carbon sink.23 
Towards a just transition
The transition to a zero-carbon economy could spur growth and job creation overall. Economic modelling 
suggests that decarbonisation will have a moderate effect on GDP, potentially raising GDP 2% by 2050. 
Similarly, the effect on employment is expected to be moderate but positive (below +1%). The impact is 
different for different sectors, however. While mining and extraction are expected to decline significantly, 
jobs will be created in construction, agriculture and power generation and distribution. Skilled technical 
jobs in the middle of the wage distribution are expected to be created, countering the trends of wage 
polarisation and hollowing-out.24 A general increase in demand for digital skills is anticipated as well. 
The economic impact will be different for different regions, however, underlining the importance of 
EU support for regional adaptation and diversification. Mining and extractive industries and related 
support services are highly concentrated in certain regions, notably in Poland, Romania and Scotland. 
These are the only industries in which the fall in employment is expected to outpace normal retirement 
rates. A wider effect will be felt in the automotive sector and energy-intensive industries such as steel, 
cement and chemicals. For these industries, the challenge is to remain competitive while undergoing 
a technological shift and dealing with the more general challenges of digitalisation and automation. 
Improving employees’ skill sets will be paramount. These industries tend to be located in Central and 
Eastern Europe, or in countries with a relatively lower GDP per capita. Energy costs are projected to rise 
significantly, but as a percentage of income they will begin to fall after 2030. Energy costs have been 
rising steeply and will continue to rise towards 2050, driven in part by the investment needed. However, 
this progression will slow as technologies become cheaper (as has been happening with solar and wind) 
and as expenditure on imported fuels declines. Moreover, electricity prices for final users will eventually 
peak as costs under the Emissions Trading Scheme fall in line with emissions.25 Assuming GDP grows 
steadily, and that households benefit fully from that growth, energy-related expenses per household 
are expected to peak by 2030.
23 High-Level Panel of the European Decarbonisation Pathways Initiative (2018), “Interim Recommendations”.
24 Eurofound (2019), “Energy scenario: Employment implications of the Paris Climate Agreement”, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg. 
25 Under net-zero emissions scenarios, a price of 350 EUR/tCO2 is expected by 2050, but falling emissions mean falling costs.
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Figure 17 
Share of employment in fossil fuel 
extraction and mining
Figure 18 
Share of employment in energy-
intensive and automotive industries
Source:  European Commission, “In-depth analysis in support of the Commission communication COM (2018) 733”, November 2018.
Nonetheless, energy costs are not borne equally across income groups. While the average household 
in the European Union spends around 7.3% of its income on energy needs, this figure rises to over 10% 
for the lowest income decile, and is even higher in some countries.26 This gap is partly the result of energy 
taxes, which are mildly regressive.27 Even though higher-income households tend to have more cars, larger 
cars, larger houses and so on, the fact that lighting, heating and transport are basic necessities means that 
price increases weigh more heavily on lower-income families. Lower-income households are also more 
likely to drive older, less efficient cars (if they own cars at all), or to live in homes in need of renovation. 
Low-income households are likely to face greater adjustment challenges, but have a lower capacity 
to do so. This is due to a range of factors: 
•  lower incomes tend to coincide with lower savings and a greater likelihood of borrowing constraints. 
Lower and middle-income households are less well-placed to carry out the enormous investment 
that is foreseen in home renovations and newer vehicles. They are more likely to be late-adjusters, 
particularly exposed to rising costs that make adjustment more difficult, while higher-income 
households might avoid these costs by investing early; 
•  regulatory emissions standards can also be regressive, raising the prices of less-efficient new and 
used vehicles preferred by people with lower income;28
26 European Commission, “In-depth analysis in support of the Commission communication COM(2018) 733”, November 2018.
27 Studies have revealed different results on this point, and there is between-country variation. For the 17 EU countries covered by Figure 19, fuel taxes are regressive 
on average, although slightly progressive from the 3rd to 5th deciles. 
28 Zachmann, G., Fredriksson, G. and Claeys, G., 2018, “The distributional effects of climate policies”, Bruegel Blueprint Series, Volume 28.
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•  low-income households are twice as likely (50% vs 27%) to rent their home29 and are therefore less 
likely to be able to renovate to reduce energy costs than other households. They are also more likely 
to pay the price of split incentives between tenants and landlords that deter renovation;
•  reducing carbon consumption may also be more difficult for poorer households. Those in the bottom 
30% in terms of income are much more likely to report that access to public transport is “very difficult” 
(Figure 20), although this pattern is less apparent in Northern Europe. One reason for this difference 
appears to be urban-rural demographics, with lower-income households being more likely to live in 
rural areas in countries with a lower per capita GDP. Another reason may be that the development of 
public transport systems varies across countries, and policies in some countries to promote universal 
access to public transport are effective in mitigating inequalities. 
Energy poverty is not just a risk; it is a reality for many people in Europe, and must be addressed in 
any successful transition. Following the 67% rise in household energy-related expenditure from 2005 
to 2016, evidence suggests that around 20% of the poorest fifth of households are late on utility bills 
and unable to keep their home adequately warm (Figure 21). Europe’s decarbonisation strategy needs 
to address this problem and not make it worse. This will require different, complementary approaches: 
strengthened social policy and welfare systems, which could benefit from revenue raised from energy 
taxes; technical and financial support to households/property owners to undertake the long-term 
investments needed; and investment in the universal provision of infrastructure and public services to 
support the populace in making the necessary lifestyle changes. 
Figure 19  
Lower-income households spend more of their income on energy, making energy taxes mildly 
regressive
Heating fuel

















Note:   Data covers 17 EU Member States with available data (Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Germany, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia, Spain and UK). Source: Flues, F. and Thomas, 
A. (2015), “The distributional effects of energy taxes”, OECD Taxation Working Papers, No. 23, OECD Publishing, Paris. http://
dx.doi.org/10.1787/5js1qwkqqrbv-en. 
29 “Low income” in this case refers to less than 60% of national median income. Data source: Eurostat EU-SILC survey. 
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Figure 20  
… but have less access to public transport as an alternative
Eastern Europe



































Note: Data for EU-28. For country groups, see footnote 3. Source: Eurofound, European Quality of Life Survey 2016.
Figure 21  
 … and are already struggling with energy costs
Unable to keep home adequately warm
Household income by deciles (1=poorest)














Note: Data for EU-28. Source: Eurofound, European Quality of Life Survey 2016.
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Ensuring that Europe works for everyone
Europe’s social model has been one of its strengths. Relatively contained levels of income inequality have 
helped the majority of Europeans feel that they have a stake in the economic future of their societies. 
Strong social safety nets have mitigated the fear of personal misfortune and structural economic change. 
A mixed economy has helped address many market failures and to provide public goods and services 
in an efficient and inclusive way, raising the quality of life. This support has also underpinned progress 
towards equality of life chances and greater social mobility, while poorer regions of Europe have been able 
to look forward to a progressive convergence in incomes with the wealthier. These factors have helped 
Europeans to feel they have a stake in Europe’s future, promoting the solidarity that is the foundation of 
our ability to take common action to solve common problems. 
Europe’s social model, however, is showing increasing signs of strain. Progress towards convergence 
across regions is proving to be uneven, and income inequality within countries has been on the rise. 
Progress towards equal life chances for all has been mixed. The social model is centred on redistribution 
to fix socially unsustainable market outcomes, rather than on creating conditions for more inclusive 
market outcomes. Opportunities to better allocate resources, which would support greater productivity 
and competitiveness, are squandered. Since the crisis, the cost of trying to compensate for undesirable 
market outcomes has become less sustainable. 
Europe’s social model needs to be reinforced, if not reinvented given the challenges ahead. The previous 
chapters have already outlined some of the impact that digitalisation and decarbonisation may have on 
inclusion. In addition, Europe faces the challenge of ageing. Ageing populations raise concerns about 
fiscal sustainability. They also mean lower potential growth. According to Eurostat’s baseline projection 
(which actually assumes significant net immigration), there will be 44 million fewer working-age people 
in Europe by 2080.30 
This chapter will provide a brief overview of the state of social inclusion in Europe: 
•  economic convergence (or divergence) across countries and regions;
•  income inequality between individuals, recognising that this dwarfs the inequalities between the 
countries and regions;
•  quality of life for Europeans, going beyond monetary outcomes, with particular reference to issues 
of work-life balance and public services; and 
•  how these inequalities affect equality of opportunity, and the knock-on effects this has on economic 
performance. 
Drawing these threads together, this chapter will discuss how Europe’s social model could be reinvented 
with a new focus on getting the structural-institutional conditions right to ensure fairer, more socially 
sustainable outcomes from the market economy. Improving the framework conditions of the market 
has the potential to reduce the risk of over-reliance on income redistribution, and can help to create an 
economy that is also ecologically sustainable and globally competitive. 
30 Source: Eurostat.
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The state of convergence across Europe 
The European Union has been a motor of social and economic convergence across its Member States, 
but in the last decade, new worrying divergence trends have emerged. Some of the main trends are: 
•  Member States with lower GDP per capita have been catching up. In 1998, the GDP per capita of the 
13 Member States that joined the European Union from 2004 or later was on average only 53% of that 
of the countries that make up the EU-28 today. This figure reached 69% by 2008 and 76% by 2018; 31 
•  Member States in the south have started to fall behind. The average GDP per capita levels of Italy, 
Greece, Portugal and Spain fell from 95% of the EU-28 level in 2008, to 83% in 2018. Before the crisis, 
all the countries except Italy were catching up;
•  national GDP levels mask strong inequalities between sub-national regions. Regional GDP per 
capita varies from 626% of the EU average in West Inner London to 31% of the average in North-West 
Bulgaria. Fourteen out of the 20 regions with the highest GDP per capita are capital cities, a group 
that includes Central and Eastern European capitals like Prague, Bratislava and Warsaw; 
•  at the regional level, disparities in GDP per capita, unemployment and youth unemployment 
have grown since the crisis, but social development indicators show continued convergence. 
Regional GDP per capita diverged from 2008 to 2014, and has converged only slightly since. Rates 
of unemployment and young people not in employment, education and training (NEET) continue 
to show a strong divergence trend since the crisis. By contrast, disparities in tertiary education, life 
expectancy and health have continued to narrow (Figure 23); 
•  a gap is opening between large metropolitan regions and middle-income ones, with only the 
poorest regions tending to catch up. Capital cities and large metropolitan regions not only tend 
to have a much higher income than other regions but also have maintained or enhanced their lead 
relative to average regional GDP per capita. The poorest decile have also moved substantially closer 
to the average. However, middle-income regions have tended to fall behind relative to the average: 
while the median region had almost exactly average GDP per capita in 2003, this fell to 90% of the 
average by 2017. While there are many exceptions, these middle-income regions are often relatively 
rural or “post-industrial”, giving rise to a sense of being “left behind” by dynamic metropolitan regions.
Figure 22  
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Note:   Values normalised at 2000 for 2000-2008 and at 2008 for 2008-2018. NEET is 15 to 24 year-olds not in employment, 
education or training. Source: Eurostat. 
31 In Purchasing Power Standards (PPS), unweighted average. Source: AMECO.
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Figure 23  




























Note:  Regions in PL, NL, FR and LT are not shown because of missing 2013 data. Source: Eurostat.
Structural change and the agglomeration effects of cities seem to be creating a regional middle-
income trap. Metropolitan areas have shown greater capacity to offer an attractive environment for 
firms, particularly in sectors such as advanced services. They have gained higher shares of high-wage 
jobs and created positive spillover effects for neighbouring areas. Regions with a particularly low GDP per 
capita, meanwhile, may have been able to exploit cost advantages, witnessing higher employment and 
productivity growth. By contrast, middle-income regions and rural regions, far from metropolitan and 
economically thriving centres, have arguably been less able to compete either on cost or on sophistication 
and innovation performance. In many cases, middle-income regions may have been affected by structural 
shifts away from “traditional” manufacturing towards more footloose services and high-tech sectors, 
although local conditions such as innovation capacity, availability of skills and quality of institutions 
should also be seen as playing a role. 32 
The concentration of growth in metropolitan areas has upsides for global competitiveness, but 
it also comes at a cost. Differences in income, job opportunities and the availability of services drive 
migration between and within EU countries. High-skilled workers have tended to benefit the most from 
mobility, moving to areas that offer the highest incomes. From 2005 to 2015, population increased by 7% 
in the metropolitan areas that include national capitals, compared to 2% in other regions. This process 
of agglomeration provides support for competitiveness, through the creation of globally competitive 
locations offering firms a large pool of highly skilled labour and a concentrated ecosystem that supports 
innovation. However, metropolitan growth also contributes to a number of negative externalities such as 
worsening transport congestion and air pollution. Rising house prices in urban areas are an increasingly 
important driver of social inequality and exclusion, while rising land rents in urban areas represent a 
growing deadweight loss on economic activity. An economic model that is over-reliant on labour mobility 
can also worsen inequality of opportunity and the efficient allocation of labour. Given the inevitable 
personal costs of migration, divergent regional growth trends imply missed and missing opportunities 
in left-behind regions. 
32 European Commission (2017), “My region, my Europe, our future - seventh report on economic, social and territorial cohesion”.
ENSURING THAT EUROPE WORKS FOR EVERYONE 35
Income inequality within EU countries
While more contained than in other world regions, economic inequality has nonetheless been on the 
rise in Europe since the 1980s. In Western Europe, the post-war social model saw a reduction in income 
inequality – before taxes and transfers – to historically low levels. However, this trend was reversed in the 
1980s. In Central and Eastern Europe, income inequality also rose markedly after the disintegration of 
the Warsaw Pact (Figure 24). While incomes for the bottom 80% of the European population have grown 
about 40% on average since 1980, the top percentile have seen their pre-tax income more than double, 
a trend that is driven by the growth of inequality within countries, rather than between them (Figure 26). 
The top 1% are estimated to have captured some 17% of European income growth over this period, more 
than the entire bottom 50%.33 This growth of inequality can be seen as relatively constrained, however, 
in comparison to the trend in the United States where the top 1%’s share of pre-tax income overtook the 
share of the bottom 50% in the mid-1990s (Figure 25). Recent research suggests that while the decline 
in labour’s share of income in the United States is largely driven by changes in manufacturing, apparent 
declines in labour’s share of income in some EU countries are accounted for by the effect of rising house 
prices and rents.34 The financial crisis also had an impact on income inequality in Europe, denting top 
percentile incomes, while also increasing hardship among lower-income groups.
Figure 24 
Top 1% – share of income 
(% of gross national income, pre-tax)
Figure 25 
Top 1% and bottom 50% – pre-tax 
income shares, Europe and United States
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Source:  World Inequality Database, WID.world. Note:  Europe, including EU-28, Western Balkan countries and 
Moldova. Source: Blanchet, T. Chancel, L. and Gethin, A. 
(2019), “How Unequal Is Europe? Evidence from Distributional 
National Accounts, 1980–2017”, WID.world Working Paper 
2019/06.
33 Blanchet, T. Chancel, L. and Gethin, A. (2019), “How Unequal Is Europe? Evidence from Distributional National Accounts, 1980–2017”, WID.world Working Paper 
2019/06.
34 Gutiérrez, G. and Pitony, S., “Revisiting the Global Decline of the (Non-Housing) Labor Share”, unpublished working paper: https://drive.google.com/file/d/1RMTq
NNJFUSxeMx9UsObAgqUeb3HU2K8i/view, accessed 27 October 2019.
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European tax and welfare systems have moderated, but not eliminated, the rise in market inequality. 
Inequality in household disposable incomes after tax has risen, particularly in the 1990s.35 Taxes and 
transfers have served to moderate income inequality, and contribute to much greater equality in disposable 
incomes in most EU countries, compared to the United States (Figure 27). However, redistribution has 
been lessened by the trend away from the taxation of top incomes and profits, and towards indirect 
taxation (such as VAT), which imposes a disproportionate burden on lower-income groups. 
Figure 26 
Distribution of income growth in Europe, 
1980-2017, by percentile
Figure 27 
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Note:  Europe, including EU-28, Western Balkan countries and 
Moldova. Source: Blanchet, T. Chancel, L. and Gethin, 
A. (2019), “How Unequal Is Europe? Evidence from 
Distributional National Accounts, 1980–2017”, WID.
world Working Paper 2019/06.
Note:  Data for EU Member States refers to 2017, for the US, to 2015. 
Source: For EU, Eurostat; for US, OECD. 
Persistent inequalities in income also exist along gender lines. Women are still less likely to be in paid 
work than men, although the employment gap in the European Union has been cut in half  since 1992, 
from 21.6% to just below 10%. Because women are less likely than men to progress in their careers and 
more likely to be employed in lower-paid occupations, there is also a persistent (though narrowing) gender 
pay gap. Among full-time employees in 2014 in the European Union, women earned 13% less than men 
(Figure 28). The gender wage gap is driven by many factors and shows no clear regional pattern. High 
unemployment levels in some countries have tended to reduce the gap as female workers with higher 
qualifications are more likely to remain in the workforce.
Inequality matters: 39% of European residents say they have difficulties making ends meet. The 
proportion of people saying that their households face at least “some difficulties” varies from 11% in 
Sweden to 86% in Greece. France also stands out, with 43%, roughly double the average for the rest of 
Northern Europe (Figure 29). The likelihood of reporting such difficulties is strongly affected by income 
distribution, reaching 58% for households below national median incomes.36 Age is also a determining 
factor, although with strikingly different patterns across Europe. Across Member States in Northern Europe 
with more developed welfare and pension systems, it is young people who are more likely to struggle, 
whereas in Eastern Europe and Italy, economic stress appears to rise with age. Intergenerational divides 
are also reflected in saving statistics. Median saving rates are very low for the under-30 group, and even 
35 Op. cit.
36 Eurofound (2017), “European Quality of Life Survey 2016: Quality of life, quality of public services and quality of society”, Publications Office of the European Union, 
Luxembourg.
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negative in Southern Europe and some other countries. While economic theory suggests that people 
should start to spend their savings upon retirement, median saving rates are actually highest among 
the over-60s, notably in Italy and France (Figure 30).
Figure 28  
Gender gap in median earnings of full-time employees (%)






























Note:  The gender wage gap is defined as the difference between median earnings of men and women, as a % of the median 
earnings of men. Data are for 2016 or latest available.
Source: OECD (2019), Gender wage gap (indicator). doi: 10.1787/7cee77aa-en.
Figure 29 
Europeans facing difficulties making 
ends meet (%)
Figure 30 
Median saving rate by age group and region, 
2015 (%)
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Note:  Sum of responses “with some difficulty”, “with difficulty” 
and “with great difficulty” with regard to whether the 
respondent’s household is able to make ends meet, 
by age of respondent. 
Source:  Eurofound, European Quality of Life Survey, 2016: Quality 
of life, quality of public services and quality of society, 
Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg.
Note:  Regional averages are population-weighted. Data missing 
for FR, DK and UK. 
Source: Eurostat. 
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Beyond money outcomes: work, unpaid work and 
public goods
To get a full picture of inequality, social inclusion and social sustainability in Europe, it is not enough 
to focus only on formal employment and monetary compensation. Well-being derives from many 
factors that include social connectedness and supportive communities, a healthy living environment, 
the availability of public goods and services, security, and the ability to balance formal employment with 
other demands on our time such as our responsibilities to care for others. 
The burden of unpaid work is enormous, unequally shared, and will rise with demographic change. 
Household survey data suggests that men in the European Union (18+ years old, including retired, 
unemployed, etc.) spend on average 23 hours per week in paid employment and 11 to 14 hours in 
unpaid housework, childcare and other care work. Women spend on average 15 hours per week in paid 
employment and 20 to 27 hours in unpaid work (2 to 6 hours of total work per week longer than the 
average man) (Figure 31). In total, unpaid work by men and women, if it were valued at the EU median 
wage, would be worth some EUR 4.4 to EUR 5.9 trillion, or 30 to 40% of EU GDP. Aside from gender 
inequality, there are obviously great differences in the care responsibilities faced by households, with 
parents of dependent children (especially single parents), and adults caring for other adults, potentially 
facing great difficulties managing different demands on their time. 
Care responsibilities are set to grow with demographic change. Already in the medium term, according 
to Eurostat’s baseline projection, the ratio of working-age persons to persons aged over 64 will decrease 
rapidly: from 3.5 to 1 in 2015 to 2.5 to 1 in 2031, eventually stabilising around 2 to 1 by 2046. Relative to 
the working-age population, this will mean a significant increase in demand for healthcare and long-term 
care, and a further increase in responsibilities for many households. 
Figure 31 
Average paid and unpaid work per adult, 
per week 
Figure 32 
Projected changes in total EU population  
and working-age population
Paid employment
Unpaid care of elderly/disabled
Lower estimate 
of total unpaid work
Unpaid housework
Unpaid childcare
0   
5   
10   
15   
20   
25   
30   
35   
40   






















Working age population: baseline projections
Working age population: no migration
0   
100   
200   
300   
400   
500   





























Note:  Upper estimates assume no overlap in hours mentioned by 
survey respondents (i.e. childcare hours reported do not 
overlap with housework hours reported). Lower estimate 
assumes maximum overlap possible between different 
activities for each respondent. 
Source:  European Quality of Life Survey and European Working 
Conditions Survey.
Source: Eurostat. 
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Figure 33  
Work-life balance in the European Union by gender and age
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Note:  Questions: a) “It has been difficult for me to fulfil my family responsibilities because of the amount of time I spend on the job”; 
b) “I have come home from work too tired to do some of the household jobs which need to be done”; c) “I have found it difficult 
to concentrate at work because of my family responsibilities”. Values shown for “Several times a month” and more frequent. 
Source:  Eurofound, European Quality of Life Survey, 2016: Quality of life, quality of public services and quality of society, Publications 
Office of the European Union, Luxembourg.
Work-life balance in the European Union is deteriorating, with negative implications for well-being 
and productivity. Indicators of how well people are able to combine paid work and other responsibilities 
show several clear patterns (Figure 33). Overall, women face greater difficulties than men, although 
middle-aged men are still the most likely to find that work leaves too little time for family responsibilities. 
Work-life balance is generally worse for the middle-aged, although the situation seems to be notably 
deteriorating for younger women. Most strikingly, work-life balance appears to have deteriorated across 
all genders and age groups over the last decade. Across Europe, the situation is better in Northern 
Europe, particularly Nordic countries, but there are very few countries that have not seen a deterioration 
(Figure 34). Time spent in paid work clearly impinges upon many people’s ability to perform care work. 
At the same time, hard-to-manage family responsibilities increasingly impair concentration at work, 
something that is likely to have a material impact on labour productivity.
Figure 34  
Work-life balance index, by country






























Note:  Summary indicator constructed from the responses to the three indicators presented in Figure 33, and normalised to a scale 
of 1 to10. 
Source:  Eurofound, European Quality of Life Survey, 2016: Quality of life, quality of public services and quality of society, 
Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg.
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Public goods and services make a huge difference to households, directly contributing to well-being 
or helping households to manage different and conflicting demands. Social transfers such as childcare 
allowances and public pensions are obviously immensely important in easing the burden of care for 
overloaded households, while others, such as unemployment insurance, are vital in mitigating  risks caused 
by macroeconomic conditions that are beyond the control of individual households. Similarly, public (or 
publically subsidised) services, such as public healthcare, education, childcare, long-term (elderly) care 
and social housing, provide in-kind benefits to all who need them and use them. Those public services 
alleviate the burden of  care and insure all households against risks. 
The provision of basic services in the European Union is far from equal. Public perceptions of the 
quality of various public services show a gradual improvement since 2007 in most EU countries, despite 
the crisis. However, there are nonetheless notable differences in perceived quality, mostly between higher 
and lower-income Member States. There are also significant differences in coverage and accessibility: 
•  across the EU, 17% of people report some difficulty in covering primary healthcare care expenses 
(formal or informal). This rises to 42% for the bottom income quartiles and to more than 75% for the 
bottom quartile in Croatia, Greece and Cyprus; 
•  the use and provision of long-term care for the elderly and disabled across Europe varies greatly. 
The proportion of people who have used long-term care services, or have experienced their use 
by someone close to them, ranges from 3% in Slovakia to 28% in France. In general, there is a clear 
relationship between reported use of long-term care and public spending;37 
•  the proportion of households with children mainly using formal childcare (including crèches and 
kindergartens, through to after-school care) ranges from more than 80% in Denmark and Sweden 
to below 20% in much of Southern and South-Eastern Europe. In the latter regions, family members 
– particularly grandparents – provide the main source of care. Even though 65% of people who use 
formal childcare report that it is free or partially funded, 39% report at least some difficulty in covering 
the cost, suggesting that cost and lack of public funding is a significant limitation on more widespread 
use and provision.
Figure 35  







Households with children that use formal childcare Households that have used nursing, home help, or residential care
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Note:  ”Formal childcare” refers to care in a facility (kindergarten, crèche, etc.), after-school care or child-minding under a formal 
contract, with reference to the youngest child of the household. Use of nursing, home help/personal services and residential 
care is by the respondent or a household member.
Source: European Quality of Life Survey, 2016.
37  European Commission (2014), Adequate social protection for long-term care needs in an ageing society, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg.
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The crisis triggered a shift in public social spending towards current expenditure and away from 
investment, with worrying implications for future capacity. At the EU level, public current expenditure 
rose through the crisis as social protection needs increased and governments sought to shield politically 
sensitive public spending. Public current expenditure in 2017 was still around 3 percentage points of 
GDP higher than the long-term average (1995-2016). Public capital expenditure was down by more 
than 1 percentage point across the European Union, and by around 4 percentage points in Eastern 
and Southern European Union countries.38 Social infrastructure was not spared this trend. Investment 
in health facilities fell by 6% and in education facilities by 22% from 2008 to 2016 (Figure 36). Public 
capital spending on housing development – which fell by 47% - can be contrasted with social transfers 
related to housing needs, which rose by 34% by 2013, before easing slightly with the recovery. The 
change also reflects a shift in housing policy away from interventions in housing supply towards 
targeted income redistribution.39 
Investment in social infrastructure appears insufficient, particularly in the context of ageing and 
urbanisation trends. No evidence exists that social expenditure fell because there was no longer a need. 
Instead, these investment trends can be linked to data on infrastructure quality and the ability of firms to 
respond to growth opportunities.40 In addition, among the 555 municipalities across the European Union 
surveyed by the EIB Municipalities Survey 2017, a large proportion reported insufficient investment in 
recent years across different sectors (with less than 1% reporting over-investment). Notably, around one 
half of municipalities say that there has been too little investment in housing (Figure 37). 
Figure 36 
Investment in social infrastructure  
in the European Union (% of GDP)
Figure 37 
Sufficiency of past investment in local 
infrastructure (% of EU municipalities surveyed)
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38 EIB Investment Report 2018/2019. 
39 National Housing Federation (2017), Public expenditure on housing: the shift from capital spend to housing allowances. A European trend? Research Briefing. 
40 EIB Investment Report 2018/2019.
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From unequal outcomes to unequal opportunities
There are growing concerns that opportunities are narrowing for younger generations in Europe.
Alongside inequalities in income and wealth, inequality of opportunity is something that drives perceptions 
of the fairness and inclusiveness of the economic system. Fairness of opportunities is reflected in social 
mobility, particularly across generations. This is the degree to which the situation of parents – factors 
such as the education level, income and household assets – determines the economic prospects of 
their children (Figure 38). Measuring such intergenerational social mobility is challenging and requires 
a long-term perspective, but there is evidence that progress towards greater social mobility in Europe 
has slowed or stalled in recent decades. 
Equality of opportunity increased for the post-war baby-boomer generation, but progress was 
reversed in many countries for Generation X. The ability of people to adopt a different type of 
occupation from that of their parents – such as supervisory work, self-employment or a liberal profession 
in contrast to manual or routine work – is central to social mobility. It provides the link between 
enablers such as educational attainment and other outcomes such as income. The baby-boomer 
generation that entered the labour market in mid-1960s to mid-80s experienced greater occupational 
mobility than their parents in nearly all EU countries (for which there is data). However, experiences 
have varied between countries for members of Generation X that entered the labour market in the 
mid-80s to mid-90s. Mobility appears to have further increased in some, such as the Netherlands and 
Greece, declined in some cases, such as France, Germany and Austria, and stabilised in others (Figure 
39). These aggregate statistics also hide important differences with regard to men and women. In 
Germany and Spain, mobility for women notably seems to have declined, while it has increased for 
men. By contrast, there seems to have been a notable decline in mobility for men of Generation X in 
the United Kingdom, France, Sweden, Austria, Estonia, and Bulgaria.41 
Figure 38  













•  Inclusiveness of education
•  Early-years care, promoting work-life balance, other support  
to families
• Inclusiveness of health care
• Inheritance taxes, other taxes
• Addressing regional disparities/urban segregation
• Support for business start-ups Occupation
Income Drivers of short-run income mobility
• Employment status changes
• Career progression and changes
• Variations in capital income
41 Eurofound (2017), “Social mobility in the EU”, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg.
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Figure 39 
Relative intergenerational persistence in parents’ occupational class 
Gen X more mobile than baby boomers: Gen X less mobile than baby boomers:
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Note:  Values are Unidiff coefficients expressing the relative likelihood of survey respondents being in a different occupational category 
from their parents, thereby abstracting from structural changes in the economy. 
Source:  Eurofound (2017), Social mobility in the EU, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg.
Mobility in educational outcomes has shown little improvement in recent decades, while country 
comparisons suggest room for improvement. Social mobility was supported by improved mobility in 
educational outcomes in the post-war period. The educational attainment of parents (proxied by years in 
education) was a progressively weaker predictor of children’s ultimate level of education for age groups 
now aged 45 or over. Since then, however, little improvement is apparent (Figure 40). Comparisons across 
countries suggest that there is still room to delink educational attainment from parents’ backgrounds, 
with wide disparities across EU countries and better performance in some non-EU peers (Figure 41). 
Figure 40  



















Note:  Persistence is expressed as the regression coefficient between parental and children’s years of schooling. 
Source:  OECD calculations based on the European Social Survey. OECD (2018), A Broken Social Elevator? How to Promote Social Mobility.
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Figure 41 
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Note:  Persistence is expressed as the regression coefficient between parental and children’s years of schooling for respondents 
aged 30-55. 
Source:  OECD calculations based on the European Social Survey. OECD (2018), A Broken Social Elevator? How to Promote Social 
Mobility.
Equality of opportunity is vital for growth and competitiveness, and is partly driven by inequalities in 
income and wealth. In economic terms, barriers to intergenerational mobility in educational outcomes 
and occupation are barriers to the efficient allocation of labour and skills. With the availability of skills 
being a major constraint for firms, particularly innovative ones, greater equality of opportunities could 
provide a competitive edge, maximising the impact of investment in skills and training. This is also the most 
recognised channel through which income and wealth inequality can affect growth and competitiveness.42 
Factors such as household spending on education, nepotism and transfers of wealth for housing, work 
experience or starting (or inheriting) a business help to pass privilege from one generation to another 
and to lock others out from educational and career opportunities. Rising prices of housing and other 
assets, alongside wealth concentration, have potentially exacerbated this issue. Across countries, high-
income inequality is associated with low social mobility, notwithstanding the effect of different national 
policies (Figure 42).
Alongside income and wealth inequality, social mobility is driven by many factors that offer 
additional opportunities for policy interventions. These include:
•  universality of access to high-standard public services, particularly education, healthcare and childcare; 
•  conditions for working families, including access to childcare, provision of social support for children 
and working-time flexibility and work-life balance;
•  regional disparities that exclude less mobile workers, trends towards class segregation in urban areas, 
and universal access to affordable housing close to employment opportunities; 
•  conditions for entrepreneurship, particularly the availability of financing for start-ups; 
•  institutional barriers to occupational choice, including discrimination and nepotism.
42  Aiyar, S. and Ebeke, C. (2019) “Inequality of opportunity, inequality of income and economic growth”, IMF Working Paper: WP/19/34. 
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Figure 42 
Intergenerational earnings mobility and income inequality

















































Note:  Intergenerational earnings mobility is estimated on the basis of education and occupation of different parent and child 
generations. Gini coefficients are from the mid-1980s to early 1990s. 
Source: OECD (2018), A Broken Social Elevator? How to Promote Social Mobility.
Labour market conditions can also have a dramatic impact on equality of life chances, particularly 
for young people affected by unemployment. Unequal access to employment is a significant driver 
of income inequality. A major concern that arose from the economic crisis is that exposure to extended 
unemployment may have a lasting negative effect on workers’ careers and earnings. Particularly vulnerable 
are older workers that may have difficulty re-entering the workforce, or young people who may feel they 
have been stigmatised. 
Employment has reached record levels in the European Union, easing concerns, but significant 
differences remain between EU countries. The EU unemployment rate fell to 6.7% in 2018, just below its 
level in 2008. At the same time, employment and labour participation has grown, with an apparent shift 
from inactivity to part-time work. This could signal a positive effect of greater working-time flexibility. 
On a less positive note, varying rates of unemployment within Europe highlight the extent to which 2008 
levels do not necessarily represent a good benchmark and leave room for improvement. When we include 
discouraged potential workers and part-time workers who would like to work more, the proportion of 
affected working-age persons reaches 14% across the European Union, and around 25% in Greece, Spain 
and Italy (Figure 43). Some countries have high levels of discouraged potential workers (Italy) and long-
term unemployed (Greece). The prevalence of part-time work as a “second best” option tends to reflect 
unemployment levels, but it plays a proportionately more significant role in many northern countries, 
including France and Germany. In the Netherlands and United Kingdom, the number of underemployed 
part-time workers is higher than unemployed workers. Proportions of young people not in employment, 
education or training have also largely returned to pre-crisis levels, but they remain elevated in Southern 
Europe. This is also the case in some Central and Eastern Member States with otherwise low unemployment 
(e.g. Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania), an issue that may require particular attention (Figure 44). 
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Figure 43 
Unemployment, underemployment and discouraged potential workers, 2018
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Note: Includes formal and informal employment, education and training. 
Source: Eurostat.
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Social sustainability matters for competitiveness 
and the zero-carbon transition 
Europe needs to invest in social inclusion to create a competitive and sustainable economy. The ability 
of the European economy to generate well-being, and to do so in a way that is seen as fair, is valuable in 
its own right. This social sustainability, however, is also necessary for an economy to be competitive and 
ecologically sustainable. The most important transition mechanisms are arguably the creation of a skilled, 
healthy and productive workforce, ensuring efficient allocation of labour through equal opportunities, 
and by ensuring public support for the dramatic changes that will grip society.
Figure 45  
Social inclusion contributes to achieving a competitive and sustainable economy
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Universal public services and work-life balance matter for productivity. As the previous chapters made 
clear, skills availability is becoming a critical constraint for European businesses, and both technological 
change and decarbonisation will only enhance the need for new skills. In this context, public support for 
universal access to high-quality education, early-years childcare and life-long learning is a vital public 
investment. At the same time, to maximise productivity we need to get the balance right between paid 
work, unpaid work in the home, and rest. With demographic change set to place growing demands on 
working-age adults, over-burdening risks weighing even more on productivity.
Inequality of outcomes has an impact on equality of opportunity, which also matters for productivity. 
In the context of intensifying competition and skill constraints, equality of opportunity is not just an 
issue of fairness. It is about the efficient allocation of resources – allowing everyone to contribute in a 
role that makes optimal use of their abilities – without which EU firms cannot hope to gain and maintain 
a competitive edge. Inequality of opportunity matters, along whatever axes it occurs, including class, 
gender and geography (given inevitable costs of movement). In the context of ageing, immigration 
represents a tremendous opportunity, but only if immigrants and their children are ensured the same 
opportunities to contribute as everyone else. As discussed above, inequality of outcomes (along lines of 
geography, class, gender, race, etc.) are one of the main drivers of inequality of opportunity, particularly 
through the channels of parental wealth, income and education. Inequality in access to services such as 
education and childcare also have a huge impact.
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Inequality weighs on solidarity and consent, without which collective responses to common challenges 
become impossible. Tackling challenges like decarbonisation and the reinvention of the European 
economy takes great collective efforts and coordination. Such collective action demands solidarity. It 
requires a widespread sense that “We’re all in the same boat”, that change will not just enable some to 
gain at the expense of others, and that everyone has an equal chance to be heard and to participate in 
the decision-making process. If electorates are susceptible to scapegoating and unrealisable promises, 
it is because the reality of the need for change is not accompanied by a convincing vision of how that 
change will be fair – or of how potential losers will be supported and protected. 
Redistributive social policy is structurally important, particularly in reducing inequality of opportunity. 
Social transfers and universal services play a vital role in breaking the cycle of limited opportunities 
from one generation to the other. They provide people with economic security, ensure that basic needs 
are met, and facilitate participation in the workforce. A well-designed tax system can provide further 
support to reducing inequality and enhancing growth.43 Many experts are calling for redistribution to 
be strengthened in response to rising inequalities.44 
However, we need to think beyond laissez-faire economics and over-reliance on income redistri-
bution. One of the characteristics of recent decades, particularly before the crisis, was a strong faith 
in a laissez-faire approach to the market, with a focus on the use of taxation and public spending to 
address unequal economic outcomes ex-post. However, a combination of factors – the global economic 
crisis, climate change and the success of active industrial policies in peer economies – are contributing 
to a shift in thinking: namely that the outcomes of the market are only as good as the inputs, including 
framework conditions that inevitably shape market outcomes in one direction or another. At the same 
time, compensating for the limitations of market outcomes, notably during the crisis, has proven to 
be a political challenge. 
We need to focus more on getting the institutional conditions right to achieve market outcomes that 
are better – more inclusive, sustainable and competitive – from the start. While ex-post redistribution 
remains a vital part of the policy mix, Europe’s reliance on it could eventually be reduced by a greater focus 
on “pre-distribution”. This would target institutional conditions, such as labour markets and corporate 
governance, that facilitate job search and job-candidate matching, fair remuneration and the fair sharing 
of the gains of productivity growth. Adequate spending and investment for public infrastructure and 
services is vital to efficiently provide public goods and support equal opportunities. 
Europe is still a global leader in social inclusion, but our social model needs to be renewed to meet 
new challenges. Comparison with the United States shows how much the social divide could have grown 
in Europe were it not for our social model. However, this model needs a new boost, particularly given 
the new challenges of digitalisation, decarbonisation and demographic change. The potential of these 
megatrends to create strong divides between winners and losers is precisely what makes an adequate 
political response so difficult, and why that response must have social justice at its heart. 
43 Akgun, O., Cournède, B. and Fournier, J. (2017), “The effects of the tax mix on inequality and growth”, OECD Economics Department Working Papers, No. 1447, OECD 
Publishing, Paris.




Europe faces a historic opportunity. By acting together, we can turn a moment of jeopardy into a unique 
chance for renewal. We need to reimagine European unity as a collective endeavour, as the only way in 
which we can turn threats to our way of life into the possibility to create a better life for all. This report 
has focused on three core areas where EU-wide political ambition and investment are truly necessary:
•  rapid technological change amid increasing global competition, with digital technologies set to 
have a dramatic impact across all sectors of the economy. Europe needs to become more competitive 
through innovation and the fast adoption of new technologies if it is to reap the benefits of this wave 
of change; 
•  increasing breakdown of the global climate and other ecosystems as a result of our economic 
system, making mitigation and adaptation action now incredibly urgent. The urgency is due partly 
to the lag times built into natural systems and partly to the unavoidable path dependency and pace 
of our own response; 
•  growing threats to social cohesion and social sustainability from multiple trends, including how we 
manage technological change and automation, the climate transition, and an ageing society. These 
trends are taking place against a backdrop of stalling convergence across Europe, several decades of 
rising income inequality, increasing burdens on households and persistent inequalities of opportunity 
that are also a drag on economic performance.
With global changes accelerating, the window of opportunity to avoid potentially disastrous disruptions 
to our economy, ecosystem and society is rapidly closing. Europe cannot afford to delay the necessary 
adjustment to cope with these concerns and cannot afford to be a slow-moving follower in key sectors. 
Europe should take a lead, determining the future direction. And it should do this efficiently, frontloading 
reforms and investment in a way that ensures the transition works for all. The decisions we make today, 
including investment in different technologies and infrastructure, will determine whether we succeed 
in protecting and enhancing the well-being of future generations of Europeans.
Three challenges, one process of renewal
Europe’s future must be competitive, sustainable and inclusive; success depends on all three. There 
is a danger that our response to the challenges we face could remain compartmentalised or selective. 
In reality, they are interdependent and a holistic approach is needed. It will be impossible to address 
each challenge successfully without a keen awareness of both the trade-offs and the potential synergies 
between them:
•  competitiveness/sustainability synergies – the zero-carbon transition will depend on a dynamic 
economy capable of carrying out a new wave of innovation and large-scale technological change. At 
the same time, this transition is an opportunity for the European Union to enhance its technological 
competitiveness and to become a global leader in key technologies. The deadline, 2050, is well within 
the time horizon of many investments we are launching and planning today. Sound investment now 
means planning to be competitive in a net-zero carbon world, avoiding the trap of stranded assets. 
Seen narrowly, there are trade-offs between the internalisation of environmental costs and the global 
competitiveness of domestic firms. But these trade-offs are overwhelmed by the benefits of acting 
fast to avoid massive disruption to our ecosystem; 
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•  sustainability/social inclusion synergies – the zero-carbon transition will be impossible if it is not 
also inclusive. Many households are already under strain from energy costs, and have limited capacity 
to invest to renew assets based on out-dated technology. Many regions of Europe have an economic 
model based on carbon-heavy sectors, with greater need to adapt. Cities can improve the quality of 
life of their inhabitants through innovative and near-zero carbon solutions. The transition will only 
succeed if all social groups, and all cities and regions across Europe, have the support they need 
to adapt to structural change and to thrive. A strong consensus is vital, underpinned by increased 
participation and a high social dividend. If we allow the transition to trigger widespread social conflict, 
it will fail; 
•  social inclusion/competitiveness synergies – to keep a competitive edge in the global economy, 
Europe cannot afford to waste any opportunity. That means making the best of the talents of all 
Europeans, making sure that everyone can gain the skills they need and the employment that allows 
these skills to be used. This requires a society in which opportunities are equal, where income and 
wealth inequalities are moderated, and in which less successful regions are not sidelined. It requires 
investment in universal access to affordable and high-quality public goods and services – from health 
and childcare to public transport and social housing – that help to give everyone a good start in life 
and the chance to participate to the best of their ability. In turn, boosting the competitiveness of the 
EU economy will be essential for ensuring access to employment and enhancing economic well-being 
for all. 
Solidarity matters. Europe can only rise to the challenge of global competition and ecological breakdown 
if, as Europeans, we can all feel that we are “in this together”, that we all have a fair stake in the future we 
are working towards, and if we all feel heard and included in the process. This requires solidarity and a 
commitment that no one will be left behind, within each Member State and across the European Union.
We must create a society that is productive, 
sustainable and inclusive by design
We need to get the environment right for innovation and competitiveness. In the past, that meant 
not just support for research and the development of new technologies, but industrial policy that was 
interventionist and even protectionist. In a more open market context, the challenge is how to create an 
enabling, supportive environment for firms to be born, to scale up, to adopt new technologies and to 
become top competitors at a global level. We still need to invest more in R&D, but we also need to place 
much greater emphasis on making sure that all the conditions are in place to make sure that investment 
bears fruit. We need to focus more on the operating environment: skills, institutions, infrastructure and 
market opportunities. We must not lose sight of the investment through which innovations spread, such 
as investment in skills, new machinery and equipment and – particularly critical for digital technology 
adoption – intangibles like software, data, training and business processes. 
Decarbonisation now requires society-wide transformation. Thus far, Europe has been picking low-
hanging fruit. Change has been largely restricted to the decarbonisation of electricity generation, aided 
by falling technology costs and de-industrialisation (off-shoring the emissions associated with our 
consumption). Full decarbonisation by 2050 implies radical shifts, with deeper, wider and much faster 
transformation of the economy and the way we live. The focus has to shift to low-carbon technology in 
industry and services, to more sustainable practices in agriculture, to the circular economy, to household 
investments in energy efficiency, and to changes in the way we get around and consume. This is why 
systemic interventions like carbon pricing have to be complemented by wider institutions, regulations, 
social policy and investment support that enables all regions, businesses and households to adapt and to 
play their part. It is why popular engagement in the design and implementation of the decarbonisation 
strategy, through representation and active participation, will be essential. 
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We need to get the institutional conditions right for more inclusive economic outcomes. While 
redistribution remains a necessary part of the policy mix, we have arguably relied on it too much to fix 
the negative externalities of the market. We need to focus more on “pre-distribution”: on designing the 
framework conditions that inevitably shape market outcomes in one direction or another. Labour market 
institutions and policies need to facilitate re-skilling and the optimal matching of jobs to candidates, while 
enhancing security in a rapidly changing economy. Alongside investment in skills, we need to recognise 
the immense importance of work-life balance, the distribution of care work and other unpaid labour, and 
the provision of quality public goods and services, such as childcare and long-term care and affordable 
public transport and housing, in enabling as many people as possible to participate in employment and 
realise their full economic potential. Such considerations have proved particularly important for women’s 
economic chances.
We must work together as Europeans
Scale and coordination matter. Renewing Europe will require action at all levels: from local communities 
and municipalities, through regional and national governments, to the European Union and, notably in 
the case of climate action, globally. Working together as Europeans is an indispensable complement to 
action at other levels: 
•  Innovative firms need a deeper single market. Innovative firms are being held back by the costs of 
operating across EU Member States, making it more difficult to reach a globally competitive scale and 
making the European Union a less attractive location for high-growth-potential firms, particularly in 
digital services. 
•  The transformation of our energy and transport systems needs continental-scale collaboration 
on harmonised technology standards and network infrastructure. 
•  Rapid innovation and scaling-up of key strategic technologies need to be driven by the concerted, 
coordinated efforts of EU countries. We need to agree common missions focused on the zero-carbon 
transition and in areas like artificial intelligence. Scale will be vital to achieving the cost reductions 
that will make new technologies viable.
•  Deeper coordination on skills and training is needed to extend opportunities and better match 
workers’ skills to market needs, supporting innovation and industrial transformation all over Europe. 
•  Policy action is needed to ensure that EU savings get to where they are needed across the continent 
to finance the tremendous investment required. We need to address the financial fragmentation 
that imposes constraints on many EU firms and projects. Gaps in risk-absorbing finance for innovation 
and for long-term strategic objectives need to be filled.
We must invest 
Europe must be ambitious and make up for lost time. That includes getting the conditions right for 
rapid and inclusive transformation. It includes setting the priorities and policies needed to enable and 
guide businesses and households, giving direction and ensuring that transformation is just and inclusive, 
with everyone getting the support needed to play a part. It also means investing, carefully but urgently, 
to prepare ourselves for the coming decades: in skills, in new technologies, in new equipment and better 
buildings, and in infrastructure fit for the challenges ahead. 
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Europe needs an ambitious programme of investment. While there is no simple figure that can be given 
for the scale of the investment required, it is worth noting the range of investment needs highlighted 
in this report: business and government R&D; skills and other intangible and tangible assets for the 
adoption of new technologies; digital, transport and social infrastructure; and all the investments by 
businesses, governments and households to achieve a transition to a zero-carbon economy. Many of 
these competencies rest at the Member State-level (particularly for education), and the role of the private 
sector is crucial for filling investment gaps. However, the magnitude of the challenge and the positive 
Europe-wide spillovers from investment call for European intervention. 
The European Investment Bank (EIB) is the dedicated EU institution for promoting strategic investment 
on behalf of all Europeans. It brings together technical expertise and the ability to mobilise tremendous 
financial resources with the overarching vision of how competiveness, sustainability and inclusion must 
be tackled together at a European scale. Some EIB initiatives provide good examples of such pro-active, 
large-scale investment promotion for competitiveness, sustainability and inclusion: 
•  Creating a critical mass for battery technology. Comprehensive financing is critical to the success 
of European missions such as the Strategic Action Plan on Batteries that aims to put Europe on a 
path towards leadership in lithium-ion batteries, a cornerstone technology for electric vehicles and 
the integration of renewable energy. The EIB is already supporting R&D and deployment all along 
the battery supply chain, including battery manufacturing and management systems, raw materials 
recycling and production, battery storage and electric vehicle  charging infrastructure.
•  Strengthening innovation ecosystems and innovation finance. Successful innovation depends 
on factors like the business environment, the quality of institutions and intangible interactions as 
much as on infrastructure and finance. Infrastructure and finance, though, represent two of the key 
bottlenecks for innovation in Europe. The European Investment Fund and the EIB Group have a very 
prominent role in equity financing, with a wide scope of activities and range of partners, although 
this is not sufficient on its own to fill the huge financing gap we face. 
•  Scaling-up sustainable finance. The magnitude of the investment gap requires a rapid scaling-up 
of sustainable finance. The EIB issued the first-ever green bond in 2007. It has since been one of the 
largest issuers of the product and has visibly contributed to the build-up of best practices within the 
intra-market platform on Green Bond Principles. The EIB’s Climate Awareness Bond (CAB) funds are 
earmarked to match disbursements to EIB lending projects contributing to climate action in the fields 
of renewable energy and energy efficiency. With the EU Taxonomy in the making, eligibility will be 
expanded into other climate change mitigation areas. The EIB is ready to build on its experience as a 
climate finance innovator and pioneer to support the tremendous investment that is now required. 
•  Unblocking and accelerating digitalisation in European firms. The EIB Group supports the financing 
needs of firms throughout their life stages, from start-ups onwards, through tailored debt, equity 
and guarantee products. Further, it is exploring how to complement its existing financing of small 
businesses and mid-caps through the provision of technical assistance and advice to identify unrealised 
opportunities and design effective digitalisation strategies, in partnership with financial intermediaries 
around the European Union. 
•  Supporting investments in energy efficiency. A drastic increase in energy efficiency investment 
is a necessary pre-condition for the achievement of the goals set in the Paris Agreement. A crucial 
dimension for improvement is the contribution of firms in this process. Energy efficiency should 
become part of firms’ mindset for investment decisions, as well as product and process design. This 
can be facilitated by the development of incentives and actions (e.g. promoting energy audits) that 
help to unlock energy efficiency benefits for firms. The EIB is increasing its focus on sustainability 
and climate action, ensuring that all operations, by 2020, take climate change into consideration and 
are compatible with the Paris Agreement. 
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•  Tackling skills gaps. EIB support for education and skills (some EUR 43 billion since 2000) addresses 
not just brick-and-mortar needs but also, increasingly, the quality of education (e.g. modernisation of 
curricula, information and communications technology equipment in schools, in-service computer 
training for teachers). Training needs are also financed alongside new infrastructure and equipment, 
such as for investment in advanced manufacturing technologies where extensive digital skills training 
is essential. 
In such ways we need to take every opportunity to pro-actively lead change through investment, achieving 
the potential and synergies of acting together across the European Union. Such examples also show the 
existing capabilities – and great potential – of the EIB as the bank of the European Union. We can provide 
a holistic approach to tackling sustainability, competitiveness and inclusion together.
We must be pro-active to ensure that structural investment needs are met. Across the European 
Union, investment has returned to average, long-term, pre-crisis levels. But we must not be complacent. 
Investment has slowly returned with the help of policy support. This has included EU funds, EIB lending 
– lately augmented by the EIB-implemented European Fund for Strategic Investment – and not least by 
extraordinarily accommodative monetary policy. We are not yet in a position to remove any of these 
supports. Instead, we need to do much more if we are to address the backlog from the European Union’s 
lost decade of investment. We need to do even more if we are to address the urgent additional needs for 
long-term, strategic investment to transform Europe’s economy. We need to act in a smart, comprehensive 
way, taking an EU-wide perspective to maximise the positive spillovers of this transformation process. 
We must be rigorous to ensure that investment is sound and support effective. To maximise the impact 
of the resources available, we need to tear down barriers to investment, and close gaps in investment 
finance and in the technical capacity to better plan and implement high-quality projects. We need to 
target gaps in risk-absorbing finance for innovative and high-growth firms and in long-term funding 
for infrastructure with a high social and economic return. We need to overcome the fragmentation that 
exists in Europe’s financial system, addressing the financing constraints of households, firms and public 
authorities where they occur and ensuring that there is no financing barrier to the upward convergence 
of regions across the European Union. Europe’s economy and society will be transformed in coming 
decades, whether we want it or not. We need to invest now for a future that is sustainable, and that 
offers prosperity to all. 
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About the European Investment Bank
The European Investment Bank is the bank of the European Union. It is the European Union’s dedicated 
institution for catalysing investment to achieve the policy objectives agreed by Member States, both 
inside the European Union and around the world. Owned by the 28 Member States, the EIB raises money 
on the international capital markets and lends these funds for investment projects that address systemic 
market failures, passing on the favourable conditions it is able to obtain as a low-risk AAA borrower. It 
targets four priority areas in support of smart and sustainable growth: innovation and skills, small and 
medium-sized businesses, climate action and strategic infrastructure.
The world’s largest multilateral lender, the EIB has provided some EUR 1.2 trillion of funding over the 
last 60 years. In 2018, the EIB provided EUR 56 billion in long-term finance to support public and private 
productive investment, with the EIF – the EIB’s risk-financing arm – providing EUR 10 billion. These funds 
helped to attract additional investment that resulted in projects worth EUR 230 billion (an initial estimate). 
The EIB Group supports innovation, skills and small businesses through instruments tailored to 
different risk profiles and stages of the firm life cycle. The EIF targets enterprises at early stages of growth 
via equity, guarantee schemes and other risk-sharing instruments. The EIB’s products are more tailored 
to small businesses and mid-caps in growth or mature stages, supporting the spread of innovations 
through existing businesses. The Bank also funds innovative projects from large-scale research to small, 
specialised spin-outs and digital networks.
The EIB is committed to helping deliver on the Paris Agreement, already devoting more than 25% 
of its lending to this goal. The Bank’s development of innovative financial instruments helps to attract 
private sector finance, in particular from institutional investors who would otherwise not be able to 
support such types of climate-related investment. The EIB also played a critical role as the issuer of the 
first green bond, and of around EUR 24 billion in green bonds in 11 currencies, helping to create what is 
now a USD 500 billion market for these instruments.
The EIB delivers sound operations to the highest standards. Projects must not only be bankable, but 
also comply with strict economic, technical, environmental and social standards to yield tangible results, 
improving lives. Alongside lending, the Bank’s blending activities can help leverage available resources, 
e.g. helping to transform EU funds into financial products such as loans, guarantees and equity. Advisory 
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